

The American Review

on the

SOVIET UNION

THE WAR

EDGAR SNOW ON

SOVIET GUERRILLA TACTICS

THE RED ARMY'S "MORALE
BUILDERS"

MIKHAIL YUREVICH LERMONTOV, 1841-1941

Documents

News Chronology

The American Review

on the

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TO OUR READERS

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GUERRILLA TACTICS IN SOVIET DEFENSE

By EDGAR SNOW

The article reproduced below was written two weeks after the Nazis invaded Russia, and before the first fine careless rapture of their panzer-led encirclement movements had vanished under the shock of Soviet counter-attacks. Now, some three months later, it is interesting to note that experience has confirmed its main contentions about the role of guerrilla warfare in Soviet defense. In short the whole world either admits freely and with admiration, or under the compulsion of facts, the following things about Russia's struggle against fascism:

The Russian masses are conducting a tenacious fight with implacable determination and courage. The Germans are occupying territory but owing to "scorched earth" tactics followed by the Russians they are not getting much of either vital raw materials or the means of production. Soviet losses unquestionably have been terrible, but so vast is the reservoir to be drawn upon that there is as yet no sign of an exhaustion of trained manpower. In the USSR, alone among the countries invaded with the exception of Greece, Hitler has failed to organize an effective Fifth Column to conduct warfare from within, on which front he won some of his richest victories in the past. The loss of important industrial centers has not immobilized Russian war production nor disorganized Russian resistance; bases far in the Urals are adequate even if all Western Russia is penetrated.

Russian guerrilla tactics on a scale more vast and successful than foreign military experts as yet understand or concede, have critically interfered with the enemy's time calculations, have repeatedly cheated his multiple penetration tactics of decisive success and have prevented his effective organization and exploitation of conquered resources. Finally, not only is guerrilla warfare spreading throughout the invaded areas of the USSR, but new fires of resistance are beginning to break out in the conqueror's rear, among peoples

[3]

whose political will was thought already extinguished. Lighted from the torch of Soviet resistance, these conflagrations may grow in numbers and size as the battle lengthens in the East.

First, sabotage on a small scale such as is now occurring in Holland, France, and Norway; next, bands of guerrillas arming themselves from the people and from assaults on fascist gendarmes, such as are already reported in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Greece; finally, perhaps the collapse of Italy, and there or in Spain or Portugal or elsewhere on the continent, a major diversion, and the possibility, if the Allies will without further delay help create it, of a second front held by formidable tank and air power. That is the nightmare which may begin to haunt the Nazi generals as they plod on through blood and snow and ashes and mud this winter, pursuing the mirage of a victory over Great Russia.

Of course it is the hopeful side of the Russian picture and one which British and American policies can do much to alter. For the facts are also clear that Soviet troops and matériel have been sacrificed on a huge scale, that the Nazis are scoring important victories, that the Red Army is falling back, and that points of vital strategic importance are being seized. But do these developments weaken the case for guerrilla defense? On the contrary, they confirm the wisdom of Soviet strategy in recognizing that their mechanized armies could not fully contain the German onslaught, and in planning guerrilla warfare in advance—the first army in Europe or Asia to do so—in coordination with the operations of the main forces.

The very conditions which eliminate the conventional army, working on a continuous front guarding bases and supply lines, provide the milieu in which the guerrilla becomes most useful. Where enemy supply and communications routes are extended into penetrated but “unconsolidated” territory, where he needs to free the maximum of troops and arms from policing tasks, when and where he is anxious to begin exploiting the war potential of his conquest in order to recoup his losses—that is the time and place of the guerrilla.

Experience to date has provided us with other valuable lessons. The most important is probably this: that efficiency in the use of guerrilla tactics can be immeasurably enhanced if the individual and the group are trained and organized, in advance of enemy penetration, around adequate *bases* created to maintain protracted strug-

gle behind enemy lines. By base here is not meant big munitions stores and matériel, so much as human centers of resistance, the *mobilization of the genius and resourcefulness of the people*, and its proper use in the loyal support of the armed irregular forces.

Under that condition it is possible to conduct successful guerrilla defense even in the plains. The Eighth Route Army demonstrated this in China but military experts in both England and America ignored the fact. Now Russians have proved beyond doubt that a well-led guerrilla army, working with a fully organized population hostile to the enemy, can indeed maintain foci of resistance far behind the main theater of war, in the plains and valleys as well as in the forests and mountains.

Another thing. With a population trained and organized in a political, economic and military sense—a total sense—before the enemy arrives, resistance to be effective need not mean solely large bands, delivering serious military blows resulting in major delays and great loss of life. Guerrilla methods can be used with small or large groups where the whole population is organized. Even the individual act of protest or violence becomes an organic part of a major strategic concept aiming to achieve, cumulatively and by all possible means, the immobilization of enemy striking power.

In the latter concept, of course, the regular army naturally still retains the role of major initiative and decisive action; and today the Russians are preserving their main forces behind their bitterly fought but apparently fully calculated withdrawal. Germany has not destroyed the Red Army. It is not likely that she will do more than severely weaken it and rob it temporarily of counter-offensive power. What is happening in economic terms is that German industrial superiority is asserting itself over a Soviet war industry which had not yet caught up with it. Germany doubtless enjoys a superiority in reserves, especially in the mechanized weapons of war. She can perhaps cancel out Russia's present offensive power by sacrificing in the task of its destruction a big part of her own reserves.

That is an undertaking fraught with peril. For Hitler cannot wipe out Russia's human reserves—and if those are able to draw from new war bases abroad, if they are effectively connected with the enormous war potential of American industry *in time*, the full coun-

ter-offensive energies of the Red Army can be restored, and the war can be concluded and won on the Eastern front.

* * *

GUERRILLA TACTICS IN SOVIET DEFENSE

A few days ago Joseph Stalin called upon the people in the war areas to adopt every possible means of defending the Soviet Fatherland against the Nazi invaders. He invoked for all Russia something like the scorched-earth policy used by the Chinese in their withdrawal from the developed bases of their eastern provinces. Already irregulars are actively harassing the flanks and rear of the fast-moving Nazi columns. And reports quoting German war correspondents indicate that Soviet partisans have had some success in slowing down the moto-mechanized invasion.

Yet for many observers Stalin's speech deepened skepticism concerning the efficiency of the Red Army rather than inspired confidence in the resoluteness of Soviet resistance. Some of our military men are frankly scornful about resort to guerrilla warfare so early in the campaign. They contend that it is futile in facing Hitler's huge machine. China provides no analogy, these people say; conditions there are entirely different.

The differences between war conditions in China and Russia are fairly obvious; but there are also important similarities which favor guerrilla warfare. Both China and Russia are vast countries with large populations. Both have rich but unevenly developed resources. Both possess numerous land and water barriers dividing or connecting deep hinterland spaces and population centers, lying in between modern transport and communications systems, which can be rendered inaccessible to motorized armies. In all these respects save numbers Russia is better off than China and in terms of political morale she is immeasurably stronger.

It is often supposed that the modern methods of warfare leave no function for the guerrilla, but recent experience has not shown that to be so. When shock power and maneuvering power were completely subordinated to fire power in the First World War the irregular did appear to become an anomaly, except in backward regions such as Arabia and Africa. But he was resuscitated in the revival of mobile warfare itself. Moreover, he came back better

armed: with the automatic rifle, the submachine gun and the light machine gun, but above all with powerful new organizational and political methods enabling him to draw upon the total population for support.

Even in a small country like Spain, which lacks a deep hinterland, guerrilla tactics proved useful when reinforced by revolutionary aims. But it is in the spacious valleys and mountains and forests and the millions of people of China and Russia that the present-day guerrilla finds his ideal milieu. In the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and their Soviet hinterland, and in the Baltic states and Poland and Rumania, Communist partisans probably will prove as useful to the main Soviet forces as they were in Civil War days.

The Nazi army can be destroyed only by a more numerous and efficient army based on a higher industrial development; but it can never be beaten at all unless time is won in which to build that army, be it the product of one country or of many. Time is the biggest element of risk in the Nazi scheme of conquest as a whole or in part. With perfect timing no dream is too fantastic to be realized; without it, the most carefully laid Nazi plan or the most skillful improvisation may fail. It is in that respect that Soviet resistance may be decisive—and that guerrilla warfare can immensely increase Hitler's difficulties.

Every military campaign may be said to have three phases: (1) penetration of the enemy's main defense lines and capture of his bases; (2) destruction of enemy main forces and military consolidation; and (3) pacification of the occupied areas, which implies crushing of the will to resist. Guerrilla war especially strives to make costly or impossible enemy exploitation of conquered resources and productive power, to keep alive the local will to resist and to frustrate enemy attempts to push farther inland for a speedy conclusion.

That the Soviets will try to accomplish those tasks by partisan activity is indicated not only by the conditions already mentioned, but also by historical experience and by certain social and economic factors which strikingly favor the use of guerrilla methods. These seem to me about as follows:

1. The Reds are the first people to come into conflict with the Nazis who fully understand the political as well as the military terms of the war. Hence they have studied and plotted the relation of

every individual to the task of national defense and have everywhere assigned the civilian population active combat duties.

2. The Red Army has 10,000,000 trained reserves. Besides, there are roughly 10,000,000 veterans of the World War and the Civil War. Altogether, some 50,000,000 people in Russia know how to shoot. For twenty years the Communists have prepared the people physically and psychologically for this moment as the supreme test of Soviet socialism.

3. The Soviet and the Collective are splendid instruments with which to conduct resistance against an invader, whether it is for a go-slow strike or mass support for armed guerrillas. The enemy cannot destroy them without paralyzing productive machinery which he badly needs; to replace them with his own people is a staggering job and a drain on his human reserves.

4. Because of all this preparation, experience and understanding, it is possible that the Nazi will find in the USSR no class ally or fifth column in any position of strategic value to them. Russia's traitors have been extirpated in advance. The loss of technical ability involved in this "liquidation" doubtless will not be so serious a handicap to Soviet defense as the absence of a fifth column will be in Hitler's problems of consolidation and pacification.

5. Although the USSR has important industrial concentrations in the menaced western Soviet republics, production of military supplies can be maintained by newly opened factories and mines beyond the Urals—particularly at Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk—or by other developments farther east.

6. Probably the Russians have planned guerrilla operations in close integration with the defense scheme of the main forces. Apparently one strategic purpose of occupation of the small countries on the Soviet perimeter was to provide a buffer war zone which could not only absorb the first shock of Nazi surprise attack, but could be stocked with numerous carefully prepared small bases from which guerrillas are now emerging to attack Nazi motorized infantry and foot soldiers after the mechanized units are well forward. Not only concealed machine-gun nests and roving cavalry and infantry are participating in these flank sorties, but small speedy tanks are being used for the first time in guerrilla war.

7. Soviet partisans will from the beginning enjoy better fighting

conditions than the Chinese guerrillas have ever had because the government and the Red Army will extend to them full military and political support and the authority to lead mass resistance among the millions. In China much of the guerrilla combat has been shouldered by the Chinese Red Army, which for months at a time receives no payment and no military or medical supplies from the anti-Red Chungking Government.

The first act of a protracted struggle envisaged by Stalin is already being performed in the war zone, where all urban buildings, establishments and material which the enemy could convert to any important military use are being destroyed. Henceforth the contribution of the guerrillas doubtless may lie in continuous demolition and sabotage work, and in intensifying these activities already begun: the creation of flying salients in the enemy's flank and rear, the wrecking of roads and bridges over which supplies are being rushed to armored divisions now hundreds of miles inside Russia but still dependent on supply bases in Germany.

It should be possible, if Hitler gains the wheat and barley fields of the Ukraine before harvest time, for guerrilla troops to burn most of the crops. Doubtless the Red Army would dynamite the oil wells of the Caucasus before abandoning them; and coal, iron, manganese and other valuable mines probably could be kept inoperative or in very low-scale production for a considerable period. No doubt the Russians would be prepared to immobilize the shipyards at Sebastopol and Leningrad, and to wreck the naval base at Kronstadt, if forced to abandon these strategic positions. Many factories may also have to be sacrificed, and here no private property rights could interfere with necessary national defense measures. In all such tasks guerrillas would play a leading role—as likewise in aborting any Nazi-backed provincial “independence” movements.

Beyond the scope of this article, yet obviously of relevance, is the sabotage which may be expected to occur throughout Europe at a growing tempo. Soviet resistance is bound to revive the hope of success and liberation. A political, economic and finally an insurrectionary movement in the conqueror's rear becomes possible. Soon the Russian guerrillas may be joined by bands fighting elsewhere on the subjugated continent.

Even in China, where the best conditions for guerrilla and par-

tisan warfare have not been realized, Japan is obliged to deploy more than a million troops to hold down the cities and rivers and railways and roads which her moto-mechanized divisions conquered with such ease years ago. Offensive after offensive has failed to destroy the forces of the Eighteenth Group Army, which has actually grown in numbers and fire power. At times more than half of all Japan's army of occupation has been deployed either in guarding points or patrol lines against surprise guerrilla attacks, or in expeditions against them.

With such poor material the guerrilla regimes in North China have been able to deny Japan a political decision, to limit her takings of cotton, wheat and tobacco production, and her exploitation of iron and coal resources, to negligible proportions, and to worry the Japanese rear so severely that they have never felt sufficient security to pursue and destroy Chiang Kai-shek's main forces far in the west.

Germany may conquer as much of Russia as Japan has taken of China, yet fail to destroy Russian resistance or to get a political decision and thus after a year or two find herself confronted with the one peril she sought above all to avoid: a continental war on two—or even four—fronts against enemies with air as well as naval supremacy.

EDGAR SNOW

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RED ARMY "MORALE BUILDERS"

THE POLITICAL COMMISSARS

Little over three weeks after Soviet borders were violated by Germany, the Red Army's political set-up was reorganized, and there emerged, in a position of renewed power and responsibility, the institution of Political Commissar. Within a few days the decree was extended to the Red Navy, and the Naval Commissar was introduced into all the Navy's schools, ships, and institutions. Little known and less understood abroad, the Commissar's reappearance was greeted with dismay by the same commentators who expressed unstinted admiration for the high morale demonstrated by the Red Army in its fight against Hitler's Wehrmacht. To the Soviets, however, the commissar and morale are inseparable in wartime. Whenever the Red soldier has taken up arms—against Wrangel, Denikin, and the Interventionists in the early years of Soviet power, against the Japanese at Lake Khasan and Nomanhan, and against the Mannerheim forces—the Military Commissar, "the representative of the Soviet Power and the Communist Party in military units and institutions,"¹ has exercised daily control over the military and political preparedness of troops and commanders, and by his personal example has provided the archetype of the politically-conscious heroic fighter. This combination of man-Friday, scholar, watchdog, pedagogue, practising psychologist, and patriot has been present on the Soviet scene in peacetime years as well. In tracing back briefly the varying degrees of authority and responsibility vested in the Political Commissar in different periods of Red Army development, some insight can be gained into the basis for the high evaluation placed on the institution by the Soviets and the role it can be expected to play in the present war.

Soviet writings state frankly that while the Military Commissar (*Voenkom*) was used by the Communist Party before 1918 (for example, reliable members were appointed to sections of the Petrograd garrison in 1917), the establishment of the *Voenkom* as an institu-

¹ *Malaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, cf. *Voenkom*.

tion stems from the period when, after regular Soviet troop formations had been organized, the necessity for control over military specialists left over from the Tsarist Army became manifest. A decree in the spring of 1918 defined the Commissar's function as follows: he is "the independent political organ of Soviet Power in the Army. The Military Commissar sees to it that the Army does not become separated from the rest of the Soviet structure and that the individual military enterprises do not become centers of conspiracies . . . the Commissar takes part in all the activities of the military leader . . . but leadership in special military fields belongs not to the Commissar but to the military specialist who works hand-in-hand with him. . . . The duty to see to the exact fulfillment of decrees rests in the Commissar. . . ."² Without the signature of the *Voenkom*, operation decrees had no force. The Commissar's signature was intended as a guarantee, chiefly to the Red Army rank and file, that the decree "was dictated by operative and not by any other (counter-revolutionary, etc.), considerations."³ So great was the cleavage between proletarian soldier and Tsarist officer that only some assurance of watchfulness to the first and protection for honest work to the second, both exercised by the Commissar, could join these disparate elements into a victorious combination. The great burden shouldered by the Commissars in the Civil War and Intervention period, the political training they gave to Red Army men and the direct part they played in battle—one in six losing his life—has won for them an honored place in Soviet military annals. The Commissars of this period, 300,000 of them, were all members of the Communist Party which surrendered practically half its membership for this work. Many, like Stalin, now hold positions of highest prestige and power. Through Soviet literature and movies, the Civil War Commissar has come to occupy a bright spot in popular imagination; merely mention of Chapaev, for example, calls to mind Furmanov, his pipe-puffing political mentor. It is the rare Soviet schoolboy who does not know that Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, Kuibyshev, names to conjure with in Soviet history, were Army political workers in those early years.

² *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, Vol. 12.

³ *Ibid.*

At the beginning of the twenties, when the Civil War was almost over, the necessity for political work in the Army increased rather than decreased. The initial large proportion of Communist Party members in the defense forces had been cut down to 1 in 20, their work in the front ranks having taken high toll. The barracks were feeling the pinch of the 1921 shortages as well as the accumulated fatigue of four World War years and an equal period of internecine strife. The Commissars were useful in bolstering morale, in creating a spirit that declared the tremendous efforts were worth making. To some extent their task was lightened by the qualitative demobilization which had begun in 1921, when effectives were reduced to one and a half million from over four, and which continued until in 1924 only 562,000 remained in the Army. Those commanders only were retained who had been tested and found true in the first few years. This decrease in number of commanders was possible not only because of the demobilization and transition to a peacetime status but because the Red Army even while engaged in battle was graduating young commanders from its military schools: 1,700 of them in 1918, 12,000 in 1919, 26,000 in 1920. Civil War leaders were sent to special military schools where theoretical knowledge was added to their fighting experience and political enthusiasm. The Red Army began to acquire commanders who were both competent and revolutionary. While in 1920 the percentage of Communist Party members among commanders was little over ten percent, by 1924 it was three times this figure. The commander began to try to take over full control of his unit. This tendency was noted and regarded as desirable. In 1924 the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided "to recognize the one-man management (*edinonachalie*) principle of the construction of the Red Army,"⁴ a principle which was destined to have quite a history in civilian administration problems as well.

Accordingly there emerged the Commander-*Edinonachalnik* who functioned as commander *and* commissar, signing his decrees and orders under this dual title. Subordinate to him there was appointed an assistant in political matters who conducted political work in his unit. But the Military Commissar, as an institution,

⁴ *Ibid.*

did not cease to exist for not every commander was a Commander-*Edinonachalnik*. Where there was an ordinary commander, the Military Commissar continued to share equally with him "full responsibility for the politico-morale condition of the unit."⁵ The control function of the Military Commissar, however, was gradually done away with after 1924 when the Revolutionary Military Soviet, in the Political Division of which the administration of Military Commissars was then lodged, sought to center his work on "the training of the personnel of the Red Army in the spirit of class solidarity and communist education."⁶ Thus in the mid-twenties there existed two situations, one in which a Commander-Commissar functioned with the aid of a subordinate political assistant, and the other in which a Military Commissar functioned side by side with the Commander. The former combination gradually gained ascendancy. While in 1925 men like Timoshenko, appointed Commander-Commissar of the Third Cavalry Corps, were few in number, by 1928 the percentage of Commander-*Edinonachalniki* had risen to 72 per cent for divisions, 54 per cent for regiments, and 42 per cent for companies. Many of them in the next few years took the courses for Commander-Commissars established for the Higher Command by the Military-Political Academy. By 1930 over 52 per cent of the Red Army's commanders were members or candidates of the Communist Party with another 4 per cent *Komsomols*, members of the Young Communist League. This figure in 1933 had grown to almost 68 per cent plus 4 per cent *Komsomols*. For all three posts—Military Commissars, Commander-*Edinonachalniki*, and assistants in the Political Sections—membership in the Communist Party was primary among the requisites which included experience in party and political-educational work and qualities of leadership.

Not only the commanding staff but the rank and file of the Red Army was changing its political and social composition. While the decree organizing the Red Army in 1918 had stressed the class nature of the Soviet fighting force (trade union, Communist Party or other organizational recommendations for Red Army men were required) and the oath pledged them to fight "for the cause of Socialism and the fraternity of peoples," the army could not but reflect the eco-

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

conomic organization of the country which had not yet had time to develop socialism. The Commissar of the early period not only was himself without wide learning, but his tools were limited (less than 400 million rubles were allotted to the defense budget in 1923/24 and again in 1924/25; in 1941, 70 billions); he lacked the technical appliances for political work—radio stations, cinemas, etc—to which Voroshilov some ten years later could proudly refer. Moreover, the advice which Kalinin in 1940 could give political workers, to instruct the Red Army and Navy men in what the Soviet State had already accomplished and imbue them with a sense of pride and love for it, was realizable in a lesser degree at a time when the Five-Year Plans had not yet been embarked upon. But from 1930 on, the Army's political worker faced a new body of men and his job of "bolshevizing" the Red Army grew both more and less difficult.

While in 1930 some 16 per cent of the Red Army consisted of members and candidates of the Communist Party, with over 18 per cent Komsomols, by 1934, according to Voroshilov, over 25 per cent were of the first category and about an equal percentage of the second, making almost half the Army part of what the Soviet constitution terms "the most active and politically-conscious citizens" (Article 126). The industrialization of the USSR reflected itself in the increased number of workers serving in the Red Army. While in 1930 barely 30 per cent were workers, in 1934 almost 46 per cent were. The peasants who entered the Army were in ever greater percentage collective farmers. With only 5 per cent of peasants in the Red Army *kolkhozniks* in 1930 when the collectivization movement had barely begun, in 1934 almost 77 per cent of Red Army peasants had come from collective farms. Among commanders the percentage of workers increased from 31 to 42 per cent between 1930 and 1933. In contrast to an illiterate Tsarist soldiery begging officers to pen letters home for them, the Red Army men were by 1934, with an exception of less than 1 per cent, wholly literate, and eager for the thousands of lectures, excursions, and discussions which their political workers arranged for them. Voroshilov in 1934 reported that "on the average there are twenty lectures, reports and excursions per man every year."⁷ These changes in cultural, politi-

⁷ Speech at the 17th Party Congress.

cal and social background gave the Bolshevik workers a firm basis on which to build and at the same time demanded of them a greater degree of learning and perspicacity. What Kalinin declared in 1940 was already experienced in 1934. "Political work is a very complex and difficult sphere of activity. Hundreds of thousands of young people join the army every year. It is not the oppressed, intimidated and ignorant youth of the past; these are courageous young people conscious of their human dignity, people with great and varied spiritual demands. It is the political worker whom they approach first and foremost with all the questions that puzzle them, with all their complaints."⁸

Military Commissars and political workers had always been required to master military as well as political knowledge. It was early seen that their usefulness would be curtailed if they were outsiders, "civvies," ignorant of the military problems of the Red Army men. The Civil War Commissar had fought side by side with his men. In the subsequent years, even when relieved of military control, the Commissar and the political worker in the Army were required, in Voroshilov's words, "to master a course of military knowledge equivalent to the program of the normal schools attended by their own type of troops."⁹ As the Army became mechanized, the political worker, too, had to expand his understanding of technical matters. He also had to learn to make full use of the cultural institutions which an enlarged defense budget enabled the Army to acquire. Red Army Houses increased from 97 to 142 between 1929 and 1934, Red Army Clubs from 800 to 1,336, and "Lenin Corners" from 8,000 to 15,000.

The direct relation between the political, economic, and cultural situation in the country at large and the kind of role entrusted to the Red Army's Commissars was again manifested in 1937 when the Soviet Government issued a decree¹⁰ reintroducing Military Commissars into all Red Army units and institutions. This was the period when the trials held in Moscow were revealing counter-revolutionary plots and intrigues carried on by some Soviet citizens with Hitler spokesmen like Hess and with figures in the Japanese

⁸ Speech at the Lenin Military Political Academy, September 19, 1940.

⁹ Speech at the 17th Party Congress.

¹⁰ *Sobr. Zak. i Ras.* No. 55, Post. 233.

Embassy. The problem of the day was to detect "enemies of the people," to guard against them. The wording of the decree, according to which political leadership and direct conduct of party-political work are entrusted to the Military Commissars, specifically mentions the need of watching out for spies, diversionists, etc., and bids the Military Commissar to develop a feeling of responsibility among the troops for keeping military secrets, the Commissar himself serving as a model in this connection. In this peace-time expansion of the institution of Military Commissar, emphasis was laid on the political rather than the military aspect of the Commissar's responsibility, although his signature was required on all orders issued by the commander. He was reminded that "for successful fulfillment of his duties he should continuously add to his military knowledge." Jointly with the Commander he was made to bear full responsibility "for instilling in Red Army men and the whole commanding staff a spirit of unfaltering loyalty to their country and the Soviet power, and merciless struggle with enemies of the people." To achieve this end, the military commissar was ordered in the decree "every day and every way to study the personnel in his unit or institution in order to know the moods, needs, and demands of men and staff." Just as in previous years, the realm of commissar activity was also to include educational-cultural affairs, his leadership covering the vast number of "self-expression" circles in the Army—literary, theatrical, artistic.

Headship of the Political Administration of the Red Army was vested in Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis who since 1930 had been editing *Pravda*. A Military Commissar himself throughout the Civil War (and a Military Commissar of the Second Rank when appointed in 1937), a front line fighter who almost lost his life in the battles against Wrangel, he was known as loyal (Communist Party member since 1918), learned (a graduate of the Institute of Red Professors—holder of the Doctor of Economic Sciences degree), and capable (awarded Order of Lenin in 1937). He faced his first year in office with a shortage of *Voenkoms*. Trustworthy Communists were taken from factories, civilian Communist Party secretaries were moved temporarily into the commissarships, but by 1938 all military units of importance had achieved a complete political apparatus of their own parallel with their military organization. From that time until

1940 the activities of the Military Commissar loomed large in the Soviet press, and from the editorials, articles, and speeches printed in those years some knowledge can be gained of the training given the *Voenkom* and the training he was expected to impart to the Red Army.

Red Star, the major press organ of the Red Army, declared, "Our commanders and commissars are in the foremost ranks of Soviet intelligentsia." (January 27, 1939.) The Army's secondary schools (*uchilishchi*) and its higher institutions, such as the Lenin Military-Political Academy, sift carefully the thousands of applications they receive. Applicants selected by the political administration of the military districts take examinations in general subjects, then submit to examination by a Special Commission; those who pass then take competitive examinations with the highest winning the right to study for a commissarship. They are generally young people who have grown up under the Soviet regime. The Lenin Military-Political Academy sets 32 years as the top age for applicants and requires an educational background of seven to ten years' schooling. Legislators, heroes of battles, Red Army men and candidates of civil party organizations vie for a place in the military-political schools. In 1938 three deputies to republic Supreme Soviets entered the Engels Military Political *Uchilishche* in Leningrad. And, a little late for the new term because they were busy fighting the Japanese, many of the heroes of Lake Khasan took their places as students in this school which boasted that some of the commissars who most distinguished themselves in the Far Eastern fighting were its graduates. So popular did the position of Commissar become that the military-political secondary schools received over 10,000 applications in 1938 from workers, *kolkhozniks*, students, office personnel. Young Red Army commanders sought training in the Academy and they, together with Red Army men, were given first choice. For other commanders and political workers a two-year correspondence course was set up by the Academy to enable them to acquire higher political training without interruption of work. The inclusion of "military-political" in the name of the Army's schools for commissars is indicative of the equal stress on the two sides of the training given them. As *Pravda* stated in an editorial (October 13, 1938), the commissar of an aviation unit should himself be an excellent flyer, the com-

missar-artilleryman an artillery expert, and the commissar of a rifle unit should have the knowledge of a commander. The commissar's training does not end with graduation from the secondary or higher school. He is enjoined "not only to teach the Army masses but to learn from them," expanding his comprehension and sensitivity so that he may legitimately be called "the spirit of his unit, the eyes and ears of the Party and Government in the Army."¹¹

His job is that of "bolshevizing the whole Red Army," *Pravda* declared in an article on "Army Bolsheviks" (September 8, 1938), "of making each unit, each battalion, each regiment, a stronghold of socialism." How he goes about doing this reflects the Soviet faith in Lenin's injunction: "Study, study, and study." Mekhlis, in sending out a directive on political study for Red Army men and young commanders in 1938-39, reminded commissars that political study instils devotion to country and readiness to defend it. The Political Administration recommended that with first year Red Army men two hundred hours of study be undertaken, half of it on the text "Our Country" and the rest divided between "USSR and Countries of Capitalism" and questions of foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet Union. Lectures in lively, simple language, and discussions were recommended to share equally in amount of time with independent reading of the materials. A few hours of check-up were to conclude the course. Second year Red Army men were to spend 180 hours and Junior Commanders 150 on "History of the Peoples of the USSR" and forty hours on Soviet policy, international and internal. The issuance of the "Short History of the Communist Party" elicited a directive from Mekhlis emphasizing the importance of this new book and providing that in 1939 ninety hours of the time set aside for commanders' studies would be devoted to this fundamental work. The Political Administration committed itself to sending lecturers periodically to major garrisons to aid those studying it, and recommended that each unit have conferences with voluntary attendance for exchange of opinions on theoretical and political questions. Special study rooms were to be set aside in Red Army Houses for those doing independent reading.

The use of army newspapers by Military Commissars was urged

¹¹ *Pravda*, September 8, 1938.

by Mekhlis. With Red Army men subscribing to more than two million copies of daily papers, the utility of this medium as an instrument of political education is obvious. In addition, every division has its own printed newspaper, and smaller units (companies, batteries, etc.), put out "wall newspapers," glorified bulletin boards with cartoons and articles contributed by the rank and file bringing to the fore current joys and grievances. The wall newspaper marches into battle and is as carefully provided for as any other important weapon. In it as indeed in many of the books, lectures, periodicals the emphasis to a large extent falls on current successes in "building socialism." In describing political work in the First Division of the Red Banner Army (*Pravda*, June 5, 1939) a Battalion Commissar describes the efforts to present the materials in interesting fashion, using diagrams, maps, placards, and illustrations, and, for a subject such as "What socialism has created in the village," ranging from classical literature to letters sent to Red Army men by their *kolkhoz* relatives.

The commissar's success in bolshevizing the army was to some extent judged by the number of Red Army men in his unit who entered into political work, by the *Voenkom's* ability to organize an "active" to assist him. One commissar describing his work in *Pravda* (June 21, 1938) dwelt at length on how a Red Army man in his unit organized an "agitation-collective" amongst his fellow Red Army men and young commanders. In recess periods and evenings, it carried on discussions not only in the military unit but with farmers on nearby collective farms, covering subjects like the new Constitution, the current Supreme Soviet elections, etc. Active people of this type who are not members of the Communist Party are usually termed non-Party Bolsheviks; the Commissar has been instrumental in satisfying the Communist Party's efforts to increase the number of these supporters in the defense forces.

While the organization of study and discussion takes much of the time of the *Voenkom*, he is also active in other spheres. The satisfaction that self-expression brings, the opportunity to acquire a skill in the arts, are made possible in the multitude of cultural centers maintained by the Red Army. In the direction of these activities the Military Commissar has always taken an important part. Each House of the Red Army (267 of them—one for every military area

or garrison) is a proving ground for talent, with its song and dance ensembles, theatres, orchestras, sports teams, language and technical courses. The Red Army finds most agreeable the Soviet leaders' faith in the enormous creative potentialities of the individual, and the Commissar is there to see that the opportunities for their realization are present and to make the Red Army man conscious of his blessings, eager to defend them.

But the Soviets reject the conception of the Military Commissar as only a "cultural worker" (a view urged by those who like Tukhachevsky were later found guilty of counter-revolutionary acts) and constantly emphasize his military role. The fighting around Lake Khasan brought in its wake many comments on "the enormous importance" (*Pravda*, October 13, 1938) of Military Commissars. In battle he was the equal of the commander. *Pravda's* editorial told of a certain commissar who three times led his fighters in attack and despite his wounds "continued, together with the commander, to lead the fighting operations." The Red Army paid no little attention to the part played by the Commissars in Spain. The description by Martin Borrero, Commissar of an Aviation Unit in the Republican Army, of his political work before battle, was published in *Krasnaia Zvezda* (January 5, 1939). His duties ranged from concern about the physical and nervous condition of the flyers, what they ate and how they slept, to talks on the significance of particular flying assignments given them. Neither in the Spanish nor the Russian view did "Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die" make for the most heroic fighters; rather, the view was acted upon that army morale is best when the men know "the reason why."

Until 1940 the Military Commissars assumed the responsibility given them in the 1937 decree, and by that time had so raised the political literacy and ideological unity of the Red Army that it was felt desirable to turn attention to the other basis for a high degree of military discipline, the authority of the commanding personnel. Efforts in this direction had already been made in the spring of 1940 when the ranks of general and admiral were introduced, and in July new disciplinary regulations were issued increasing the authority of the commanders. On August 12th the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On Strengthening the Unity of Command in the Red Army and Red Navy," declared that

the Political Commissar as an institution had accomplished its purpose since the commander had reached the point in the last few years where he could be invested with full powers and full responsibility for political work as well. While repealing the 1937 regulations, the 1940 decree created in each unit of the Red Army and the Red Navy the post of Deputy Commander in Charge of Political Work. The issue involved was one of singleness of command not one of cessation of political work. In fact, *Pravda* declared editorially the day the decree was issued, "Political work in the unit always occupied and will occupy a large place." One-man management was again to be the ruling principle of Red Army organization and even more strongly than in the pre-1937 period for now all commanders were deemed worthy of complete authority and in no need of assistance. In the peacetime situation it was felt that the objective of discipline which the Soviets regard as "inseparable from victory" could best be achieved by centering all authority in the commander. "Events in the last two years when Red Army men took up arms at Khasan, at Khalkin-Gol, in the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, as well as against Finnish Whiteguards, showed the excellent preparation of the commanding personnel," declared *Pravda*, paying warm tribute at the same time to the role played by Political Commissars since the earliest years.

Thus the institution of Military Commissar was ushered out but not "unhonored and unsung." It was no break in policy, no courting of a wronged or a despised helpmate, when on July 16, 1941 the Military Commissar was reinstated. A weapon proven useful in war-time was sharpened up again. The recent decree declares, "The war forced upon us has radically changed the conditions of activity in the Red Army." While further increasing the need and value of political work among the fighting forces, the decree continues, "the war has also made more complex the work of regimental and divisional commanders and makes necessary the rendering of all possible assistance to them by the political workers not only in the sphere of political activities but in the military sphere as well." Hence, it concludes, the significance and responsibility of the political worker should be increased just as it was at the time of Civil War and Intervention. To this end the office of Political Commissar is introduced into all regiments, divisions, staffs, military schools

and institutions, and the office of Political Instructor into all companies, batteries and squadrons. Mekhlis was once more appointed to the headship of the Political Administration of the Red Army.

While the description¹² of the new decree reinstituting the Military Commissar does not mention specifically whether his signature is required jointly with the commander's on all orders, it is probable that this is so, just as it was under the 1918 and 1937 decrees, since the 1941 decree deliberately harkens back to the position of the political worker at the time of Civil War and Foreign Military Intervention. From newspaper dispatches in recent weeks and the brief reports in Soviet communiques at least three facets of commissar activity are already in evidence which recall the behavior patterns set up by *Voenkoms* in previous wartime situations; heroism, readiness to take over the command, and instruction. The first is typified in a Soviet report¹³ describing the work of Company Assistant Political Instructor Ogrommy who volunteered to blow up a bridge, and leading his men five miles in open country, placed heavy boxes of explosives a bare hundred yards from enemy lines. The second is found in an account¹⁴ of the heroic actions of Company Political Instructor Butarev when he replaced the commander who had been killed in action and led his company in a counter attack. The third is apparent in *Izvestia's* description¹⁵ of the service performed by the Military Commissars in mitigating the psychological impact of German tactics. "The offensive of the German army units itself is very imposing," say the Soviet newspaper, "racing motor-cyclists ceaselessly firing from automatic guns, with tanks in their wake and infantry closing up the rear to consolidate captured positions—while above all bombers drop tons of deadly metal." These tactics of "sudden attack and mad onslaught," it continues, are apt to impress "the average man. . . . It is here that the work of the military commissars acquires great importance." The military commissars, "the majority of whom are men with ten and more years in service and with special military and political education," communicate to the Red Army men some comprehension of Fascist tactics, explaining that they are not only

¹² Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the USSR, July 18, 1941.

¹³ *Ibid.*, July 19, 1941.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Summarized in *Anglo-Russian News Bulletin*, August 6, 1941.

based on military expediency but are designed to frighten the enemy and eliminate opportunity for thought and doubt among Hitler's troops.

The "mutual assistance pacts" between commander and commissar, epitomized in the Civil War days by the fraternal relationship of Commander Chapaev and Commissar Furmanov, is apparently a feature of the present set-up as well. The famous Soviet writer Eugene Petroff in a dispatch from the Central Front on September 10 (*The New York Times*, September 11, 1941) tells of the pleasant atmosphere observable between commanders and commissars. "Much that is foolish has been written about commissars," he comments. "To understand just what the commissar is, it is necessary to remember that above all the commander and the commissar nearly always are friends."

The commissar—pedagogue, practicing psychologist, watchdog, scholar, man-Friday, and patriot—seems to be up at bat again, and in a Big League game. The Soviets manifest no uneasiness about his ability to score. They not only back their own commissars but argue warmly for proper estimation of the contribution made by this institution as far back as in the days of the French Revolution. They do not accept the view of "bourgeois historians" that the presence of Military Commissars in France of the 1790's weakened military operations. "The role of the Military Commissar must be evaluated positively," an authoritative Soviet reference work¹⁶ declares of the French situation, and the same statement typifies their attitude towards the institution as it has developed in response to their own needs. Lenin's belief—"Without the Military Commissar we would not have had the Red Army"—is firmly supported by present Soviet leaders who were themselves once the morale builders of a victorious Red Army.

R.M.S.

Note: The decree of July 16 was received in full after this article had gone to press. It is apparent that what seemed a matter of conjecture—the joint signing of orders by Commander and Commissar—is specifically provided for in the text. See page 59.

R.M.S.

¹⁶ *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, Vol. 12. Published in 1928—the Soviet position on this subject is apparently unchanged.

MIKHAIL YUREVICH LERMONTOV*

1841 - 1941

By SAMUEL H. CROSS

Four and a half years ago lovers of Russian literature throughout the world celebrated the centenary of the death of Alexander Pushkin, greatest Russian poet of all time, who died on January 29, 1837, the victim of a wound received in a duel with a foreign adventurer. Pushkin's adversary was the tool of aristocratic circles with no understanding for the master's art and with intense hostility toward his liberal ideals. This year, memory naturally turns again to another young Russian poet, scarcely less gifted than his older contemporary, and fated to meet an equally tragic end. For, like Pushkin, Mikhail Yurevich Lermontov contended during most of his brief mature life with official incomprehension and enmity. He too met his death by a duelist's bullet, on July 27, 1841, under circumstances as ambiguous as those surrounding Pushkin's death, though until recently less fully explained and understood. But death interrupted Lermontov's artistic and social evolution at a point when he was ten years younger than Pushkin. The older poet was thirty-seven years of age when D'Anthès's bullet silenced him, while Lermontov passed from the scene some ten weeks before reaching his twenty-seventh birthday.

A striking association with Pushkin founded Lermontov's public reputation as a man of letters. Hardly had the great poet been laid to rest when official circles, who had hoped the storm of indignation provoked by his death would be allayed by denying him a public funeral and by spiriting his body away secretly by night to the

[The centenary of Lermontov's death was marked throughout the Soviet Union by the appearance of new editions of his works, new critical appraisals, and new biographical material discovered by Soviet scholars. Since 1917 his writings have been printed in twenty-nine languages of nationalities within the Soviet Union; over five million copies of his works were issued between 1917 and 1939, twice as many as had appeared in the years before 1917. Lermontov is not only a popular author in the Soviet Union but a well-studied one. A listing of the many articles and books written about him and his work by Soviet scholars is available in the Institute's library.—Ed.]

remote country churchyard of his choice, were shocked to learn that a brilliant satirical poem currently circulating in manuscript was directed against the court clique which had hounded Pushkin to his untimely end and against the immigré officer who had lent himself as their instrument. It was entitled *The Poet's Death*:

The poet has died, a slave to honor;
He fell, by rumor ill-bestead.
Shot through the heart, for vengeance thirsting,
He bowed at last his haughty head.
With noble heart in sorrow broken
By bitter shame fools oft repeated,
He rose against a hostile world
Alone once more, and lies defeated.
Dead now he lies, and all your weeping
Is but an empty grief. Why raise
A tardy limping vindication,
An empty chorusing of praise,
When destiny's decree is spoken!
You spurred his gallant gift to wrath,
You fanned to flame his hidden fire,
For your amusement used his singing,
Now silenced at your base desire.
So laugh your fill! He could not bear
The torment of your final slander,
Quenched like a torch his genius rare,
Faded his wreath in grim surrender.
Ruthless the slayer aimed his blow,
One shot was dealt with malice cold,
Evenly beat his empty heart,
The pistol found too firm a hold.
What wonder this? From foreign shore,
Time-serving like a hundred more
Cast up to us by jealous fate,
Sneering, he boldly dared to scorn
The tongue to which he was not born,
And robbed us of our late-won glory,
Nor knew within that moment gory
To what he raised a hand of hate.

And so he perished—he was taken
Like that sweet singer, his creation,

Of jealousy the hopeless, harmless prey,
Late sung by his divine improvisation,
Who fell by cruel hand, courageous and forsaken.¹

Why did he leave life's calm delights and friendly pleasure
For all that worldly sphere of malice with its measure

Of disillusion for a free and fiery heart?
And why to trifling slanderers give his hand,
Why lend belief to perjured words and favors,

When he from youth knew men, and dwelt apart?
They filched his poet's crown, and on his brow they set

A crown of thorns with laurels plaited,
Whose points, with glory's fronds mismated,
Scarred the proud crest whereon they falsely met.

The whisperings of some crafty fool
Shed venom on his last declining hour,
And thus he died, of vain revenge the tool,
Under the secret grief of hopes deceived.

So now our singer's tones are stilled.
His voice no more to men shall sound.

Narrow and grim his plot of ground,
And his hot lips earth's seal has chilled.

You, scions of a bloated generation,
Born of those sires whose baseness is their fame,
You courtiers, who long with servile heel
Have crushed the hopes of embittered nation,
And greedy run beside a ruler's wheel,
The hangmen of each free and glorious name,
You hide behind the shadow of the gown
Of Justice deeds you rightly shame to own!
But God's great court remains, you friends of crime!
By that dread judge is no redemption sold,
He waits unmoved by promises of gold,
His prescience weighs your acts throughout all time.
Before that judge your slanders all are vain,
And, though it stream down in a poison flood,
Never shall your black gore wash out again
The poet's righteous blood!

¹ The reference is of course to Vladimir Lenski, the young and charming romantic poet of Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin*, who is killed in a duel by the hero under tragic circumstances.

The author of this poem was soon revealed as Mikhail Lermontov, a 23-year-old subaltern in one of the guard regiments, who had long been socially suspect for his reputed misanthropy and sharp tongue. But no one who read this poem or gossiped about it realized at the moment that one day its author would stand close beside Pushkin in the front rank of Russian genius.

Lermontov's previous life had not been particularly happy. Born at Moscow on October 15 (old style, October 3), 1814, the son of a retired but impecunious army officer and a wealthy heiress from the land-owning nobility, he traced his descent on his father's side from a Scotch soldier of fortune named Learmont, who had entered the Russian service in 1613. Not only was Lermontov's mother's family wealthy and well-connected; they also stood close to contemporary liberal aspirations. Two of Lermontov's great-uncles were affiliated with the ill-starred Decembrist conspiracy of 1825, and the excitement caused by its repression left lasting traces on the mind and the ideals of the poet, who was just over eleven when the conspiracy failed and its adherents felt the wrath of Nicholas I.

Madame Lermontova, however, did not survive to witness her only son's boyhood and youth. Immediately after her marriage, her husband's modest circumstances provoked repeated collisions between him and his mother-in-law, which were not without effect upon the young wife's already frail constitution, and she died early in 1817 when Mikhail was in his third year. The boy's psychological development was unfavorably influenced for some time thereafter by constant bickering between his father, who did not die till 1831, and his wealthy maternal grandmother, Madame Arseneva, who brought him up, though Mikhail always regarded his father with affectionate sympathy as the unhappy victim of domestic strife. As a boy the future poet was not particularly robust. He was taken by his grandmother for treatment at Caucasian watering-places, where the neighboring mountains and gorges made so profound an impression upon him that he later deliberately chose them as the scene for some of his most distinguished mature works.

Like many another young aristocrat of his day, Lermontov received his early instruction at home, on his grandmother's estate of Tarkhany, in the province of Penza, south of Moscow. His first teacher was a German governess, so that he was deprived of those

early contacts with Russian folk-traditions which had proved so stimulating to Pushkin's creative imagination. She was succeeded by three French tutors and finally by an Englishman named Vinson, who is responsible for Lermontov's early, intimate, and significant acquaintance with the works of Byron, Moore, and Scott. Lermontov was, in fact, a gifted linguist all his life, and his command of English and German far surpassed Pushkin's comparatively limited competence in those tongues. While his French tutors gave him an acquaintance with Chénier, La Harpe, and Lamartine, it was not until 1827, when his grandmother entered him in the preparatory school for nobles attached to the University of Moscow, that he became familiar with the works of preceding and contemporary Russian poets. His cousin and school-fellow A. P. Shan-Girei noted at the time that he was reading Lomonosov, Derzhavin, Dmitriev, Ozerov, Batiushkov, Krylov, Zhukovski, Kozlov, and Pushkin, so that his knowledge of the best in Russian literature rapidly expanded as he approached adolescence and was responsible for his initial efforts at original composition.

Lermontov's first guidance in Russian letters came from Semyon Raich, a gifted instructor in the university preparatory school at Moscow, which cultivated a literary tradition dating back to the days of Karamzin, Zhukovski, and the early Russian romanticists generally. Raich even organized a literary club for his more promising pupils, and from 1828 forward Lermontov practised eagerly in both lyric and narrative verse. His earliest lyric efforts reflect either Zhukovski or the pseudo-classicists of the late eighteenth century. Both the breadth and the attentiveness of his juvenile reading is proved by his first narrative poem, "The Circassians," a story of a native attack on a Russian encampment in the Caucasus. Here, though the subject-matter is prosy and conventional, the trochaic tetrameters, familiar as the meter of Pushkin's southern narratives, are handled with skill. But it is more significant that young Lermontov's poem contains 22 lines borrowed from Dmitriev's "Moscow Liberated," 8 from the same poet's "Woman of Whims," 17 lines from Kozlov's "Natalia Dolgorukova," 4 from Pushkin's "Prisoner of the Caucasus," 2 from Byron's "Bride of Abydos," and various others from Dmitriev's "Yermak" and Batiushkov's "The Warrior's Dream." Similarly, Lermontov's "Prisoner of the Cau-

casus" (also 1828) is little more than a rewriting of Pushkin's poem of the same name with the story so revised that the Circassian heroine, instead of drowning herself as her beloved captive departs, makes her fatal plunge into the Terek after the escaping Russian has fallen prey to a shot by her own father.

The third poem of this juvenile series, "The Corsair," is more reminiscent of Pushkin's "Bandit Brothers" than of Byron and, apart from echoes of Kozlov and Bestuzhev-Marlinski, closes (characteristically enough) with a familiar verse lifted bodily from Pushkin's "Prisoner of the Caucasus." Pushkin's influence, and in particular that of "The Bandit Brothers," is equally discernible in Lermontov's narrative poem "The Criminal" (1829), and another of Pushkin's southern poems, "The Fountain of Bakhchisarai," combined with motives from "Childe Harold," provided the inspiration for "Two Captive Women," a slightly later fragment (1830). A Byronic hero, hostile to the world from which he is cut off by an ailing conscience, even though he regrets its loss, appears in Lermontov's "Julio" (1830). This poem is the author's first experiment in rhymed couplets, though all with masculine rhyme and therefore lacking in variety and flexibility.

The young poet's habit of sketching themes early in his career which he later amplifies and polishes is well illustrated by his two narrative poems of this period, "The Lithuanian Girl" and "A Confession" (1830). The motive of overpowering love with tragic outcome, later effectively developed in "Boyarín Orsha" (1835-36), inspire both these poems, and the second, though describing a Spanish milieu, adds the implication, subsequently expressed with greater force in both "Boyarín Orsha" and "The Mtzyri" ("The Novice," 1840), that a moment of supreme rapture or of intense vital enjoyment is infinitely more precious than a trite and uneventful lifetime. Similarly, though "The Demon," in certain respects Lermontov's most distinguished narrative verse, was not completed in its final redaction till 1841, the basic idea of a demonic hero cast out of Paradise, bored with evil, and seeking regeneration through the pure love of a mortal girl was present in Lermontov's fancy as early as 1829 and 1831, to both of which years belong fairly lengthy preliminary drafts, quite apart from the fragment "Azrail" (1831), in which a phase of the same concept is briefly treated.

The three most mature poems among Lermontov's early narrative experiments all deal with Caucasian scenes. "Kally" (Circassian for "murderer"; 1831) is a brief tragic episode of romantic revenge. "Aul Bastundzhi" (*aul* is again the Circassian word for "village") tells the story of the fatal love of two brothers for the same wild but loyal heroine. "Izmail Bey," the third poem of this series (1832), is a considerably more ambitious effort and echoes certain political and social motives which are absent from its predecessors.

The poem relates how a Caucasian prince, educated among the Russians, returned to his native mountains to lead his people in their fight to defend their liberty against the invader from the north. It is significant as proving how the Decembrist ideal of freedom aroused in Lermontov a profound sympathy for the resistance of the mountaineers to Russian aggression. Izmail is a Byronic hero in that he is disillusioned and embittered by previous experiences. He bears the scars of an unhappy love affair and resists the advances of the mountain maid who adores him. He attaches little personal meaning to his heroic efforts and sets no store by honor and fame. When he finally falls before an assassin's bullet, the very mountaineers whom he has successfully led abandon his corpse when a cross hung about his neck reveals that, for all his loyalty and courage, he had been converted to Christianity.

From a literary standpoint, "Izmail Bey" is interesting as the bearer of reminiscences from Byron, Mickiewicz ("Conrad Wallenrod"), Victor Hugo ("Les Orientales"), and Scott ("Lady of the Lake"). The motive of love for freedom had been briefly touched by Lermontov the previous year in another narrative poem, "The Last Son of Freedom" (1830), dealing with the resistance of the early mediaeval Slavs of Novgorod against the Varangian interlopers from Sweden. It thus reproduced a theme developed by the Decembrist poet Ryleev and therefore may be associated with "Izmail Bey" as an index of the extent to which Lermontov, at the age of 17, was permeated with the liberal ideas of his time.

At the same stage in his development Lermontov also experimented manfully with the one literary genre in which he was fated to achieve no success. During 1830-1831 he composed three dramas: "The Spaniards" (in verse; 1830), "Menschen and Leidenschaften" ("Men and Passions," prose, 1830), and "A Strange Man" (prose,

with a few lyric fragments; 1831). The young Russian liberals of the late '20's were all admirers of Schiller, and in 1829 Lermontov had seen the great actor Mochalov in Schiller's "The Robbers" and "Intrigue and Love" ("Kabale und Liebe"). "The Spaniards," with its melodramatic story of the ward of a Spanish grandee who, thrown out for loving his guardian's daughter, finds refuge with a Jewish family whose son he proves to be, and then kills his sweetheart to save her from a worse fate, quite naturally echoes Schiller's "Don Carlos" and Lessing's "Nathan der Weise" (especially in the Jewish scenes). At the same time, the emphasis on human dignity, as opposed to criteria of birth or creed, shows Lermontov to have been a convinced partisan of the eighteenth-century ideal of equality, and his attack on corrupt representatives of the Inquisition reveals a spirit congenitally hostile to absolutism in any form.

In his two prose plays of this period Lermontov, with characteristic subjectivity, attacked a significant autobiographical subject. I have already referred to the conflict between the poet's father and his maternal grandmother which disturbed his youth. This conflict provides the subject-matter for "Menschen und Leidenschaften." Here we find a young man torn between loyalty to his grandmother, who has brought him up, and to his less wealthy father, to whom he owes filial attachment. The situation is complicated by the intrigues of one of the old lady's menials and by an unhappy love affair which apparently reflects Lermontov's own attachment to one of his cousins. This drama of misunderstandings culminates in the hero's futile suicide. Here again is expressed the same romantic and idealistic liberalism which pervades "The Spaniards." As the young hero complains, "My love for human freedom has been taken for free-thinking," a serious reproach in those conservative days. Lermontov's portrayal of the relations between serf and master reveals his opposition to serfdom, and the old grandmother, despite her partiality to her grandson, stands only a little above Fonvizin's famous Madame Prostakova.

In "A Strange Man," the dramatic conflict shifts to a son's efforts to effect a reconciliation between his separated parents and is again complicated by a love affair. It ends tragically, since the mother dies with her husband still obdurate, and the hero's reason is unhinged by the disloyalty of his sweetheart. While our knowledge of Ler-

montov's family circumstances is not so detailed as to permit a binding estimate as to how much of the parental complication is based on fact, the unhappy love-affair reflects the author's similar experience with Natalia Ivanova. Still more significant is a further expression of hostility to serfdom in a scene where peasant characters directly complain of the maltreatment they suffer, and this material is the more interesting because it derives from the same popularly known facts which inspired a similar protest in "Dmitri Kalinin," an almost contemporary juvenile drama of Vissarion Belinski, subsequently the founder of Russian literary criticism. But neither Belinski's play nor any of Lermontov's three ever saw the stage.

Though Lermontov began his lyric composition under the influence of S. E. Raich in 1828 when he was only fourteen, the most significant period for his earlier lyric falls within the years 1830-32, as he ripened into maturity. Like Pushkin, Lermontov was gifted with a striking lyric facility, and he also was widely enough read to know the best contemporary models which would serve him as a base for self-criticism. Subjectively the most appealing of Lermontov's juvenile lyrics are his amatory poems. He was an intense youth, capable of deep attachments which were seldom taken as seriously by the girls who inspired them as they were by the budding poet to whom they were major experiences crying for poetic expression. More important, however, than these numerous deeply personal items or than Lermontov's numerous imitations and translations of Byron and Schiller (occasionally even Bürger and Goethe), are those pathetic references to his father's unhappy lot and the poems in which Lermontov either hints at his political convictions or speculates on his own destiny.

The first lyric poem of a relatively long series in which, throughout his brief career, Lermontov commented bitterly on the state of affairs in his own country, is entitled "Laments of a Turk," written in 1829. Here, perhaps only parroting the thoughts of his Decembrist relatives, the young poet refers to a country where "man groans under slavery and chains." The next year, in "Prophecy," suggested by the cholera revolts of 1830, with a recollection of Pugachev, Lermontov wrote of "Russia's black year, when the imperial crown shall fall," and three other poems reflect the poet's reaction to the

French events of 1830. One of these in particular, "Paris, July 30, attacking Charles X, shows upon what reservoir of invective Lermontov drew when he wrote "The Poet's Death." Again, late in 1830, a brief halt at Novgorod, rich in memories of its mediæval republic, suggested the query, "Sons of the snows, sons of the Slavs, why has your courage failed?" and, with a thought of Nicholas I and the Decembrists, continued, "Your tyrant shall perish as all tyrants have perished ere now."

For the poet's own state of mind, his most significant poem of this period is "July 11, 1831" which, while obviously suggested by Byron's "Lines to Augusta," is still essentially personal. Here it appears clearly that Lermontov, though intensely ambitious and justly conscious of his own talents, felt that his gifts would hardly be appreciated in his own generation, even if they eventually were to guarantee him immortality. However sincere and impressionable, he realized that the finer elements of his character were hidden behind his habitual reserve. He was unhappy except in constant activity; "I cannot understand," he exclaims, "what it means to rest . . . I always fear that I shall accomplish nothing." He had a premonition of an early and cruel death. All these are thoughts which, with due allowance for adolescent exaggeration, indicate that Lermontov would never become reconciled to the reality about him and that, however cynical or misanthropic he might appear, he was dominated by an active idealism which would drive him to face any obstacle, social or internal. Such a character was hardly likely to achieve official favor during the reign of Nicholas I.

Another early and familiar lyric which, though less personal, reveals Lermontov's personal approach to life is the short poem called "The Angel," also written in 1831:

On wings of a dove through the blue deeps of night
Soared an angel all silver with light.
The moon and the stars and the clouds in a throng
Heard, breathless, his glorious song.

He sang the deep peace of the souls of the blest,
Who dwell in the gardens of rest;
Of God was his lay and the bright Seraphim,
And wondrously sweet was his hymn.

He bore in his arms a soul tender in years,
Condemned to earth's sorrow and tears,
And the strains of his anthem, though wordless, e'ermore
Lived on in the soul that he bore.

And many a year on this earth did it pine,
Afire with a longing divine,
But cheerless and dead seemed the songs of this earth
To those of the land of its birth.

Here Lermontov hints at the destiny of a man whose soul longs for an unattainable ideal. The poet contrasts the ideal world and the real world and expresses the constant sadness and disappointment which must accompany earnest but vain striving.

The motive of separation from the "mob," of dissatisfaction with the life, the aims, and the activity of people around him, is traceable through all his works. Lermontov's human ideal was a man capable of deep feeling and heroic effort, possessing a soul undaunted by any barrier. His protests against human pettiness are as vehement as Byron's, but while, as a youth, Lermontov felt considerable spiritual affinity with Byron, he was always conscious that there was something essentially Russian in himself that distinguished him from the English poet.

The increasing maturity noted in Lermontov's literary production between 1830 and 1832 is a natural reflex of certain factors in his biography. He entered the University of Moscow in the fall of 1830 and remained there for two years. At the moment the faculty was at an extreme low ebb, so that the chief value of a university course lay in association with the brainier and more progressive members of the student body, which included at the time such future stars as Belinski, Stankevich, Herzen, and Goncharov. But Lermontov was intimate with none of them. Unfortunately, his upbringing had made him shy, and no matter how intense his inner intellectual life was—as we see from his creative work of the period—his university comrades knew little of it. Then, too, items of personal tragedy tended to turn Lermontov back upon himself. His unlucky attachment for Natalya Ivanova, which inspired his most poignant personal lyrics of this period and provided him even with dramatic material, ran its tragic course in the summer of 1831, and

that same autumn his father died. At one moment Lermontov even dreamed of going abroad, though the project was not carried out. Hence, though Lermontov in his sympathies was much closer to his liberal contemporaries than they realized, domestic circumstances prevented his intimate association with them. His departure from the University of Moscow in 1832 was due both to dissatisfaction with its staff and curriculum and to a personal desire for new scenes and independence.

But tact was not one of Lermontov's conspicuous virtues, and at a public examination in 1832 he managed to offend one professor by remarking confidently that his own reading was more extensive and more up-to-date than his master's. As a result he flunked the course, and when he endeavored to enter the University of St. Petersburg he found that the certificate he had received from Moscow was not such as to procure him the advanced standing he thought he deserved. Then, with characteristic impetuosity, he suddenly determined to enter the School for Guard Ensigns and Cavalry Cadets at the Northern capital. Now even though Lermontov's contacts with his progressive contemporaries at Moscow had been far from intense, he had still absorbed much of their spirit and aspirations. But in this military academy intellectual interests were practically nonexistent, and consequently the two years Lermontov spent there were thoroughly painful to him, and his literary output declined almost to the vanishing point. In order not to appear a sissy, he took pains to seem as rough and free from inhibitions as his classmates. He also turned his poetic talents to the production of erotic verse which unfavorably affected his reputation when he eventually returned to serious production, the more so because his earlier poetry was totally unknown, for the reason that not a line of Lermontov appeared in print until 1835.

It is significant, however, that even before Lermontov graduated from military school in November, 1834, he had begun to experiment with prose. The result was the fragment entitled "Vadim," which treats an episode of the Pugachev rebellion of 1773-1775. This is, of course, a new point of contact with Pushkin, who was gathering material on these events at the same time. The political tone of "Vadim" is reminiscent of "Izmail Bey" and bears witness to the continuity of the Decembrist influence upon Lermontov's politi-

cal and social views. From the standpoint of style "Vadim" is also interesting as evidence of a transition from the romantic and magniloquent manner of Bestuzhev-Marlinski to the more natural and popular vernacular which Lermontov handled with such distinction and effectiveness in his later prose.

Upon graduation, Lermontov was immediately appointed a cornet in a guard regiment stationed at Tsarskoe Selo, the imperial residential suburb of St. Petersburg, where his grandmother set him up in considerable luxury. Despite his wealth, Lermontov's own family position was not such as to win him immediate acceptance in the highest circles of society in St. Petersburg. This goal he attained by feverish attentions to socially prominent young ladies whom he later threw over. Later in 1835, and against his will, Lermontov first appeared in print when his narrative poem, "Hadzhi Abrek," a story of Caucasian revenge, reminiscent of "Kally" and other items of the Caucasian cycle, appeared in *The Library for Reading*, a contemporary periodical. The same year he renewed his attention to the drama, and composed "The Masquerade," his verse-tragedy of jealousy and mistaken identity, based in large degree upon the author's own observations of high society and with such obvious references to known personages that, when Lermontov sought to have the play presented, it was rejected by the censorship and returned to him for alterations. Between November, 1835, and October, 1836, Lermontov revised the play twice without securing a favorable decision from the censorship, which maintained the position that the passions and the characters depicted were "too violent," and that "virtue in it was not sufficiently rewarded," a not unnatural decision in view of the fact that a wife as innocent as Desdemona is poisoned by her jealous husband, who goes insane when his mistake is revealed. The play was never staged in full till 1862 and was subsequently revived under the direction of Meyerhold by the Alexandrinski Theater at St. Petersburg early in 1917. Lermontov's last theatrical venture, "Two Brothers," a gloomy and otherwise unimportant drama of jealousy and seduction, also dates from 1836.

Lermontov's intensified interest in prose was expressed at the same juncture by his effort to compose a society novel with the collaboration of his intimate friend, S. A. Raevski, a well-educated

official of the War Ministry. This work dragged on into 1838 and was never completed, though it served as the germ of Lermontov's prose masterpiece, "A Hero of Our Time." It is also significant for the evidence it provides of Lermontov's growth toward the ability to supplement a purely personal and subjective attitude toward reality with objective generalizations. His two chief main characters, the hero Pechorin and his counterfoil, the obscure and democratic official Krasinski, are no longer exclusively autobiographical in essence, but begin to assume the guise of genuinely artistic creations. The influence of Pushkin's "Eugene Onegin," whose family name, derived from Lake Onega, is balanced by Pechorin's, from the river Pechora, requires no demonstration. The love motive is mainly based on Lermontov's own experiences with Barbara Lopukhina, to whom the poet had been devoted before her marriage, and with Catherine Sushkova, upon whom he had recently avenged himself somewhat churlishly for her affronts to his adolescent vanity in earlier years.

Though Lermontov's lyric output between 1833 and 1836 was scanty, he returned at the same time to the theme of one of his juvenile narrative poems, "Confession" (1830), and, having shifted the scene from Spain to the border wars of Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century, produced "Boyarin Orsha," a grim story of a father's ingenious revenge on his daughter's lover. Orsha, the revenging father, condemns his daughter to a slow death by starvation after he has consigned Arseni, her low-born lover, to a monastery cell. But Arseni escapes to join the Poles, and after he has mortally wounded Orsha in battle, the relentless old noble tells him his sweetheart is still waiting. Arseni, gallops back to the castle and, on opening the girl's chamber, finds nothing but her whitening bones. But Arseni, a strong character longing for great deeds and engrossing experiences, clings to the conviction that any moment of intense happiness outweighs whatever sorrow it may bring and is worth more than years of vegetative existence. Such was the basic idea of "Confession," and Lermontov was to repeat it five years later in "The Novice." "Boyarin Orsha" was not printed till 1842, when it inspired the enthusiastic comments of the critic Belinski.

A similar return to an earlier theme is exemplified by one of Lermontov's most popular short poems, "Borodino," celebrating

the battle of that name against Napoleon and composed early in 1837, though its basic conception is found in "The Field of Borodino," a poem written as a soldier's brief narrative in 1830. No verse better exemplifies Lermontov's improved command of realistic popular language than this for, where the first sketch is stiff and literary, the final draft, opening with the little boy's question to the veteran, and continuing with its swinging rhythm, its rising climax, and its unaffected patriotism, stands out as one of the most affecting battle-poems in world literature. It also has a deeper meaning, since Lermontov intended it as a reproach to an unheroic, inactive present generation, contrasting them unfavorably with their courageous fathers.

Within barely a month after "Borodino" was composed came the turn in Lermontov's fortunes which transformed him from a socially-inclined guard-officer with liberal sympathies, a reputation for cynicism, and a maturing literary talent into a voice of protest and an object of official mistrust. Pushkin's duel with D'Anthès took place late in the afternoon of January 27, 1837. The first part of Lermontov's "The Poet's Death"—ending with "And his hot lips earth's seal has chilled"—was written the next day and was immediately passed about in numerous manuscript copies. Unluckily, however, shortly after Pushkin's death Lermontov had a conversation with a brother officer and relative, who found Pushkin blameworthy and defended D'Anthès's procedure. Lermontov's resentment was immediately aroused, and he added the next sixteen lines of bitter invective. Gossips made haste to call these verses to the attention of Count Benckendorff, the chief of the secret police who had been Pushkin's nemesis. Benckendorff, as a friend of Lermontov's grandmother, was prepared to present the affair in the most harmless possible light. But Nicholas I, who was not inclined to be indulgent in such matters, had already received an anonymous copy of the objectionable lines with the heading "A Call to Revolution." Lermontov, together with his friend Raevski, was arrested on February 21. A week later Lermontov was transferred to a regiment on active duty in the Caucasus, while poor Raevski, who had circulated the poem, was relegated to far-off Olonetz. From this moment to his untimely death Lermontov was never free of official surveillance.

While under arrest and awaiting the decision as to his punishment, Lermontov composed several lyrics, among which one in particular describes a moment of calm rare in his troubled life and reveals at the same time the depth of his feeling for nature and his religious sentiments:

When o'er the yellowing corn a fleeting shadow rushes,
And fragrant forest glades reecho in the breeze,
And in the garden depths the ripe plum hides its blushes
Within the luscious shade of brightly verdant trees;

When, bathed in fragrant dew, the purple lily,
At golden morn or evening shot with red,
From out a leafy bush peeps shyly,
And nods with friendly mien its dainty head;

When, down the shady glen, the bubbling streamlet dances
And, lulling thought to sleep by its incessant song,
Lips me the secrets, with a thousand glances,
Of that still corner whence it speeds along;

Then does my troubled soul find solace for a while,
Then vanish for a time the furrows from my brow,
And happiness is mine a moment here below,
And in the skies I see God smile!

During his first exile in the Caucasus, which lasted only until the following October, when Nicholas I, on Benckendorff's recommendation, authorized his transfer to a dragoon regiment stationed at Novgorod, Lermontov composed one of his most striking narrative poems which, like "Boyarín Orsha," transports us to the epoch of Ivan the Terrible, this time not in a spirit of romantic grimness, but rather with strict attention to historical reality. A veritable *tour de force* in verse, vocabulary, and rhythm, "The Song of Ivan Vasilyevich, his young guardsman, and the bold merchant Kalashnikov" is the most satisfactory attempt in all modern Russian literature to reproduce the tone and the popular atmosphere of the *byliny* (mediæval epic episodes), admirable for its re-creation of the manners and customs of the sixteenth century. In three episodes supposedly narrated by wandering minstrels, it relates how Ivan's young guardsman insults the wife of the merchant Kalashnikov, who satisfies his personal honor by killing the guardsman in a public boxing-

match under the Tsar's very eyes and dies happy because he knows his duty is done. This example of strength of character was not set up by Lermontov as an abstraction but, as was the case with "Borodino," it expresses the poet's rising dissatisfaction with contemporary reality, which he contrasts unfavorably with the heroism of the past. As an example of true popular spirit in artistic literature, "The Song of Tsar Vasilyevich" is a unique creation. But since Lermontov was still the victim of official displeasure, it was published anonymously only after the intervention of the older poet Zhukovski.

Thanks once more to his grandmother's good offices, Lermontov in April, 1838, was transferred back to his original horse-guards regiment at St. Petersburg, where he remained until March, 1840. During his stay in the Caucasus, his political horizon had been widened by acquaintance and conversation with surviving Decembrists living in exile there. But while they were talking resignedly of appeasement and reconciliation with the government, Lermontov was not ready to compromise his progressive ideals. On his return to the Northern capital, he was lionized as a celebrated author and a veteran of active warfare. Yet his chief interest lay not in society, but in association with like-minded friends. Recent archive studies have proved that he was closely affiliated with a liberal group known as "The Circle of Sixteen," which eagerly discussed the historical mission of Russia and debated the issues raised by Peter Chaadaev in his famous "Philosophical Letter" (1836), where the theory of Russian occidentalism (the inevitability of Russia's following the analogy of Western nations in its intellectual and political development) was first expressed in detail. The novelist Turgenev, who met Lermontov at this period, wrote of him: "There was something ominous and tragic in Lermontov's appearance, a sort of gloomy, baleful power. A reflective contempt and passion seemed to spring from his swarthy countenance and from the fixed gaze of his large eyes. . . . The inner Lermontov, in all probability, was profoundly bored—he was suffocating in this stifling atmosphere into which fate had thrust him."

Lermontov's current state of mind and his attitude toward contemporary society is vividly expressed in his poem "Reflexion" (written in 1838):

Sadly I look on this our generation—
Its future course shows either black or null;
Meanwhile, beneath its load of doubt and information,
In idleness it grows but old and dull.
Ere we have left the crib, our sires have each bestowed
A wealth of ancient faults and tardy wit,
And life oppresses us, a smooth and goalless road,
A feast for someone else's benefit.
Basely indifferent alike to good and ill
We fade without a struggle ere we flower,
Cowards in face of danger, weak of will,
And scurvy minions in the face of power.
Like to a meagre fruit, grown ripe before its time,
That brings delight to neither tongue nor eye—
Amid the blooms it hangs, an orphan, in its prime—
The hour of their beauty is its hour to die!
We have consumed our minds with fruitless learning,
From friends and intimates we enviously hide
The noble voice, the highest hopes and yearning,
By disbelief in passions we deride.
The cup of pleasure we have scarce attained,
Which none the less our youthful powers destroys;
Feared of satiety, we have forever drained
The choicest essence from the list of joys.
Neither the dreams of poetry nor art's creation
Quicken our minds with rapture; we commit
To prison in our breast the remnant of sensation—
The greed-interred treasure knows no benefit.
By accident we love and hate alike, withhold
The smallest sacrifice to love or ire;
And in our soul there reigns a certain secret cold
When the blood boils with fire.
Bored by our ancestors' luxurious recreation,
Their lewdness, scrupulous and infantile,
We hasten to the grave sans joy or approbation,
While casting back a mocking smile.
A surly-tempered throng and soon forgot,
We travel through the world without a noise or trace,
And neither genius-fostered work, nor fruitful thought
Bequeath unto the race.
And, stern as citizen and judge, in future years

Our offspring shall with scornful verse our dust bemire;
As a deluded son with bitter jeers
Mocks his degenerate sire.

(Translated by Jeannette Eyre)

The deadly irony of this poem is paired in Lermontov's production of this period with a lighter ironic touch which animates three narrative poems, "The Tambov Treasurer's Wife" ("Tambovskaiia Kaznacheisha," 1838), "Sashka" (1839), and "A Tale for Children" (1839), the playful realism of which is a direct legacy from "Eugene Onegin." This fact is directly indicated by the author in his dedication to the first of these, when he speaks of deliberately adopting "the meter of Onegin" for his ingenious story of the card-playing provincial official who wagered his wife in a game with a flirtatious cavalryman—and lost her, though his cards were good. Again, in the opening lines of "Sashka," Lermontov ironically remarks that he too had indulged the current taste for stories of "tortures, chains, and exiles, the dark excitements of the soul," but now he will laugh as he sings, for his hero "is a good sport." So he is, for the story (unfinished), apart from the hero's biography in a satirical vein, relates to his adventures with a pulchritudinous Jewish prostitute of irregular origin, interspersed with the author's own pointed reflexions on men and things and composed in witty eleven-line stanzas of interrhymed iambic pentameter. It does, however, contain in the Mavruska episode Lermontov's most eloquent indictment of serfdom. The third poem of this series, "A Tale for Children," written in 1840, but also unfinished, is interesting as a realistic parody of the demonic theme which had engaged Lermontov's fancy so long in "The Demon," and diverting because the author here again hits off his own previous works with considerable humor.

From these poems which reveal the rapid development of his naturalistic gifts Lermontov turned back to the romantic theme which he had previously used in "The Confession" and "Boyarín Orsha"—the portrayal of a hero who prefers a magnificent moment or one engrossing experience to a prosaic lifetime of unrelieved calm. The fact that the scene of "The Mtzyri" ("The Novice") is laid in the Caucasus was the result of a story he had heard in 1837 at Mtskhét (the old Georgian capital on the highway just north of

Tiflis) from an aged monk who told of his unsuccessful attempt as a novice to flee from the monastery to which he had been consigned. In the poem the hero, a Circassian orphan, escapes from his monastery during a storm and wanders freely among the mountains for three days until fatally injured in a struggle with a panther. He is found half-dead by the monks, who carry him back to their retreat, but on his death-bed he still asserts that without these three blessed days of freedom, whatever their consequences, his life would have been more sombre and more pitiable than the impotent old age of the monk attending him in his last hours. In "The Mtzyri" the descriptions of the mountain landscapes through which the novice's wanderings led him possess extraordinary grace and eloquence, and an interesting lyric digression is provided by the novice's dream as he sleeps wearily on the ground after his struggle with the wild beast. He imagines himself transported to the bottom of a river, where a golden fish circles about his head and, as it weaves its way through the water, sings a lullaby in verse of haunting melody.

During 1838 and 1839, Lermontov also worked upon his prose masterpiece, the novel "A Hero of Our Time," three episodes of which ("Bela," "Taman" and "The Fatalist") appeared during the course of 1839 in the magazine *National Notes*. In this novel we once more encounter Pechorin, the hero of the earlier unfinished society novel "Princess Ligovskaia." Attacking the frivolity of society, Lermontov had there remarked that it will not suffer in its midst any powerful or disturbing character of Pechorin's type. Of him Lermontov wrote, "He was not offended by the world's indifference to him, because he estimated the world at its proper value. Another might have lost courage and abandoned the field to his adversaries. But the difficulty of any struggle excites a resolute character, and Pechorin promised himself that he would come off victorious." Pechorin himself says in a conversation with the Princess, "If you asked me what I prefer, a moment of absolute bliss or years of ambiguous happiness, I had rather resolve to concentrate all my feelings and passions on one divine moment and then suffer as much as you like than stretch them out little by little and distribute them in compartments between intervals of boredom or sorrow." To this resolve he remains faithful as the chief figure of "A Hero of Our Time."

This novel consists of three parts, entitled "Bela," "Maksim Maksimych," and "Pechorin's Dairy." The last part is divided in turn into three episodes, "Taman," "Princess Mary," and "The Fatalist." Lermontov first reveals his hero through the goodhearted words of his comrade-in-arms, Captain Maksim Maksimych, then shows Pechorin himself, and finally gives Pechorin's self-analysis in his diary. The Bela episode describes Pechorin's successful campaign to win the heart of a beautiful Caucasian girl. But once he has won her, he loses interest, and would have abandoned her without scruple if she had not fallen victim to the dagger of a revengeful mountaineer. Pechorin here says of himself, "I have an unhappy character; whether my education made me so or whether God so created me, I don't know; I know only that if I cause the unhappiness of others I am no less unhappy myself. . . . My heart has been spoiled by society, my imagination is restless, my heart insatiable. Everything seems small to me. I can accustom myself just as easily to pain as to enjoyment, and my life gets emptier day by day." Yet he was capable of bold resolution and quick action, as in the Taman episode, where his life is threatened by the wiles of a smuggler's sweetheart.

In "Princess Mary," Pechorin is annoyed by another less intelligent officer, Grushnitzki, who is in love with the charming young princess. He thus conceives a desire to make Grushnitzki ridiculous by winning the Princess Mary's love away from him. Having done so, he almost drives the poor girl crazy by failing to declare himself and, not being in love with her, studiously refrains from doing so. He regards Mary simply as a specimen for vivisection. "I look upon the suffering and joys of others only in relation to myself," he says, "as I should at food which sustains my spiritual powers." The reason for this curious attitude is that he is conscious of his own strength and ability, but is deprived of any opportunity for its rational and useful application. He lacks real purpose, engrossing experiences, and inspiring associations. Conflict and struggle is his element, yet he finds no problem equal to his capacity. In the existing state of society, a man of his ability is condemned to exploits of momentary bravery, empty conquests of women, and an existence on the whole aimless and tedious. He thus fades from the scene unused. Pechorin is an even more tragic figure than Onegin because

he is stronger and more gifted than Pushkin's hero. Yet both are superfluous in a society which could not use them.

"A Hero of Our Time" is thus a psychological novel with social implications and the first such book in Russian literature. Like many another of Lermontov's works, it is not without traces of his reading, including such characteristic and related foreign works as Alfred de Vigny's "Servitude et grandeur militaires," Alfred de Musset's "Confession d'un enfant du siècle," Benjamin Constant's "Adolphe," and (earlier than all these) Châteaubriand's "René." As the first Russian novel designed to treat the problems of a contemporary man in contemporary society, "A Hero of Our Time" is the initial item in the series continued by the ampler works of Turgenev, Goncharov, Dostoevski, and L. N. Tolstoi.

Though the publication of the three episodes from "A Hero of Our Time" added to Lermontov's already considerable reputation, he was bored in society and unpopular in influential circles. His record as the author of "The Poet's Death" and his association with The Sixteen made him an object of suspicion to the official world which resented not only his attitude of independence but also, and perhaps still more, his luck with the ladies.

Both these factors soon produced unpleasant consequences. Lermontov was paying marked attention at the time to a young widow who openly preferred the poet to his rival, the Vicomte de Barante, son of the French Minister to St. Petersburg. In February, 1840, the Viscount challenged Lermontov to a duel which passed off harmlessly; de Barante missed and Lermontov fired in the air. De Barante was offended when Lermontov told of the episode, whereupon Lermontov offered him the satisfaction of fighting again. De Barante refused, but his mother told Benckendorff that the poet had actually challenged her son, which was not the case. By this time Benckendorff was rather fed up with Lermontov's exploits and had him first arrested, and then, in May, 1840, transferred to the Caucasus once more. It was during Lermontov's confinement to the guardhouse in consequence of this episode that he was visited by the great critic Belinski, who, after a short conversation, recognized in Lermontov, as he said, "a deep and mighty spirit," a talent of imposing promise.

In the Caucasus Lermontov again distinguished himself by con-

spicuous bravery and was granted a brief leave in St. Petersburg early in 1841. This time he brought northward with him the finished manuscript of "The Demon," the long narrative poem which he had been working over and revising ever since 1829 and which he eventually perfected into a masterpiece containing certain faultless passages literally unparalleled in art and eloquence by any other Russian poet. The interest of the poem concentrates on the Demon, an angel cast out of Paradise. He has become bored with evil and dreams only of the sinless days before his exile when he still believed and loved. In other words, like his creator, he too is a seeker after an ideal, but this time an ideal once possessed and now lost. His wandering gaze lights on Tamara, the beautiful Georgian princess, who is about to be married, and he comes to think of her as the instrument of his regeneration and return to heaven. But he begins his progress toward virtue by an evil deed, because he causes the death of Tamara's betrothed, though he still believes that Tamara's love, if he wins it, will purify him and restore him to his previous sinless state. But it unfortunately turns out that there are borders of evil which the Demon, however repentant, may not pass with any hope of return. His hopes are dashed. Angels carry Tamara's soul away to Paradise, but the Demon's tears cannot lift the curse that weighs upon him. He is left alone with his fruitless dreams, chained forever to the task of sowing evil in the hearts of men—a task infinitely dull because men offer no resistance to his corrupting suggestions.

In this poetic pursuit of the unattainable there is much psychological autobiography, just as is the case with "The Mtzyri" and its forerunners, many of Lermontov's lyrics, and the character of Pechorin. The demonic hero, whether or not diverted by love for a mortal maiden, appears in the world literature from Milton down through Klopstock to Byron, Thomas Moore, and Alfred de Vigny, the last three of whom were all suggestive to Lermontov. To this theme he added a masterly Caucasian landscape, oriental folklore, the intensity of his own aspirations, and his noble gifts of poetic expression. These prominent factors, however notable, have usually led to an over-estimation of the importance of "The Demon" in Lermontov's creative career, for at the time it became known it was to some extent the relic of a past stage in his evolution, and its ro-

mantic atmosphere is not as permanently significant for Lermontov's mature character as the capacity of objective and realistic analysis, coupled with social consciousness, which distinguishes "A Hero of Our Time" and the less known narrative poems of his last few years. Though "The Demon" was circulated in manuscript during Lermontov's lifetime, it was not printed till the first published edition appeared abroad in 1856.

Among Lermontov's minor poems written in the two or three years before his death there are several which poignantly express his disillusion and his profound disgust with the society about him. Thus, in the poem beginning "Believe not in thyself, young dreamer" (1838), he warns a youthful poet against revealing his inmost thoughts to "the simple-hearted mob," for whom neither his enthusiasms nor his sorrows are intelligible. Then, in the lines beginning, "How often, lost amid the motley throng," he confesses how often in social gatherings youthful memories swarmed in upon him, and his scorn for high society bursts out in the final lines, "How I should like to spoil their merriment, and boldly cast into their eyes an iron verse, with bitterness and malice sprinkled." Not often is this resentment softened by tender accents like those of "A Cossack Cradle Song" (1840), sung by the mother as she bends over her child in the moonlight, and suggested by Scott's "Lullaby of an Infant Chief," though itself based on folklore materials. Lermontov's most mature views on the poet's function and the nature of his own inspiration are contained in the poetic conversation entitled "Journalist, Reader, and Writer," written while he was in confinement after his duel with de Barante and representing the concentrate of recent discussions with Belinski and other friends. The bitterest short poem Lermontov ever composed was written just before he departed for his second exile in the Caucasus:

Farewell, oh Russia, drab and sordid,
Land of slaves and masters proud,
And you, blue uniforms and gaudy, (i.e., Benckendorff's police)
You, too, the meek and cringing crowd.

Beyond Caucasian peaks, perchance,
I'll find concealment from your Tsars,
From their all-seeing baleful glance,
And from their omnipresent ears.

Yet in Lermontov there was a love of country deeper than any sentimental or jingoistic nationalism, as revealed in his poem "My Native Land," written in the last year of his life:

I love my native land, and yet this love is strange—
A love my reason shall not override! . . .
It is not glory, blood's exchange,
Nor peace, replete with confidence and pride,
Nor heritage of dark antiquity's tradition
That quicken in my heart a joyous recognition.
And still I love—though why I cannot say—
The frozen silence of her steppes, the motion
Of forests measureless that rock and sway—
Her overbrimming rivers, like the ocean;
To gallop in a cart along a country road
I love—and when my tired glance cuts through the night
Along the way, while aching for a night's abode,
To meet sad hamlets and their trembling firelight.
I love the smoke-burnt meadows' yield,
Steppe-wagons, wandering nomad-wise,
And there, across the yellow field,
Two birches shining on the rise.
I see with joy that few can know
The threshing-floor piled high with grain,
The straw-thatched cottage, and below
Carved sashes round the window-pane,
Or watch till midnight in the damp
Of feast-day eve, for recreation,
Dances with whistling, shout, and stamp,
'Mid drunken peasants' conversation.

(Translated by Jeannette Eyre)

But heavier shadows were about to fall across the poet's path. At the time of Lermontov's leave in St. Petersburg in February, 1841, he would have liked to quit the army altogether, but circumstances interfered. He had the bad luck to appear at a ball given by the Countess Vorontzova-Dashkova, where members of the royal family present found it scandalous that an officer more or less in disgrace should show himself on such an occasion. This episode was unfavorably reported, and it has been lately asserted (though the basic materials are not as yet available to me) that a romantic

but unfortunate encounter with a young Grand Duchess also aggravated the resentment of the Tsar himself. In a letter of the time Lermontov actually refers, in connection with this ball, to "a new drama which had a very curious dénouement," and his little poem, "The Sea Princess," with its last line, "He will remember the Emperor's daughter," apparently has more behind it than a mere folklore reminiscence. At any rate, Lermontov was peremptorily ordered to return to the Caucasus whither, despite dark forebodings, he set out late in April. Recently published documents reveal that by Benckendorff's order Lermontov, during his final stay in the Caucasus, was under the surveillance of an officer especially sent from St. Petersburg for this duty, and instructions from the capital forbade the poet's superiors to detail him on expeditions against the mountaineers so that he would have no chance of earning retirement by meritorious conduct in the field. The special and hostile interest shown in Lermontov by high circles is evidence that their enmity was now greatly intensified.

Upon arriving at his station in Piatigorsk late in May, Lermontov rented a small house with three comrades. The poet possessed, besides his literary talents, a marked genius for wisecracks and horse-play. Among his acquaintance at Piatigorsk was Major Nicholas Martynov, now retired, but a former contemporary of Lermontov in the cavalry school eight years before. Martynov had developed various Byronic eccentricities, among them the habit of wearing a gigantic dagger which Lermontov often caricatured, along with Martynov's slight skill as a rider. Whatever the underground motives behind the eventual duel, it is clear that when Martynov on one occasion remarked that he had had enough of Lermontov's ridicule and requested the poet to stop it, Lermontov replied that, if Martynov desired to fight, he was ready. According to the traditional account, the seconds thought the pretext for a quarrel so trifling that they tried for three days to effect a reconciliation. Recent investigators have pointed out, however, that the conditions of the duel, which allowed for three shots by each adversary, were unusually barbaric, while after the duel the suspension of the normal judicial investigation, the inaccurate and evasive testimony of Martynov and the seconds, the obvious interest of the imperial court in the proceedings, and the leniency of the punishment meted out

to Martynov and his associates all point to sinister official concern with the whole affair. The duel took place at 7 P.M. on July 27 (old style—July 15), 1841. Lermontov never even fired his pistol, but Martynov's first shot pierced his heart and killed him instantly. Thus Nicholas I achieved the unenviable distinction of having tolerated, if he did not connive at, what was practically the deliberate murder of the two most gifted Russian poets of his time.

Lermontov was first and foremost a lyric poet, and his works throughout his entire career was subjective in varying degrees. Yet toward its close he was developing the capacity to convey a picture or expound an idea in which he himself was not sentimentally involved. In "A Hero of Our Time" and in his late ironic poems his approach to life is essentially realistic, and he thus continues with somewhat different emphasis the tendency initiated by Pushkin in "The Tales of Belkin" and "The Captain's Daughter." As his poems of political and social implication prove, he participated manfully in the struggle for liberty and humanity to which Russian literature of the classic period was consecrated. Though in this respect he is the direct precursor of Nekrasov, he was in his own day something of an isolated figure because of his forceful temperament and the vigor of his protest against human triviality and official tyranny. The motives of his poetry are perhaps not as numerous or as varied as those of Pushkin's, but such motives as were congenial he expressed with unrivalled intensity and in a language, whether prose or verse, which places him among the eternal masters of the Russian tongue. As his career closed, he passed beyond his internal world to truly objective creation and the depiction of life and character in universal terms. Death claimed him at the beginning of this transition. His mature life was lived in the stifling atmosphere of the reactionary policy imposed by Nicholas I, and he expressed the noblest aspirations of those of his generation who refused to be repressed or passively despondent. As Belinski, the great critic who knew him, remarked, "It is not the question whether Lermontov was equal to Pushkin or even superior to him in the power of his talent. But it is unquestionable that, even though not superior to Pushkin, Lermontov was called upon to express in himself and to satisfy with his poetry a period incomparably more exacting in its requirements and in its characters than that of which Pushkin's poetry is the expression."

DOCUMENTS

TEXT OF ANGLO-SOVIET PACT

The Agreement

Agreement for joint action by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the war against Germany:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have concluded the present agreement and declare as follows:

1. The two governments mutually undertake to render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.

2. They further undertake that during this war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

The present agreement has been concluded in duplicate in the Russian and English languages. Both texts have equal force.

Moscow, July 12, 1941.

By the authority of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: *Molotov*, Deputy President of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

By the authority of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom: *Stafford Cripps*, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Protocol

Protocol to the agreement for joint action by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the war against Germany, concluded July 12, 1941:

Upon conclusion of the agreement for joint action by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the war against Germany, the con-

tracting parties have agreed that the aforesaid agreement enters into force immediately upon signature and is not subject to ratification.

The present protocol has been drawn up in duplicate in the Russian and English languages. Both texts have equal force.

Moscow, July 12, 1941.

By the authority of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: *Molotov*, Deputy President of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

By the authority of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom: *Stafford Cripps*, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

[Source: *New York Times*, July 14, 1941].

TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC

Signed in London on July 18, 1941 on behalf of the USSR by Ivan Maisky, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Great Britain and on behalf of the Czechoslovakian Republic by Jan Masaryk, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The text of the agreement reads:

The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia have reached the following agreement:

1. The two governments have agreed immediately to exchange ministers.
2. The two governments mutually undertake to aid and support each other in every way in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.
3. The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consents to the formation on the territory of the USSR of national Czechoslovak military units under a commander appointed by the Czechoslovak government in agreement with the Soviet government. The Czechoslovak military units on the territory of the USSR will operate under the direction of the high military command of the USSR.
4. The present agreement comes into force immediately after its signature and is not subject to ratification.
5. The present agreement is drawn up in two copies, each of them in Russian and the Czechoslovak languages. Both texts have equal force.

TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE EXILED GOVERNMENT OF POLAND

Signed in London on July 30, 1941 on behalf of the USSR by Ivan Maisky, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR and on behalf of the exiled Polish government by Premier General Wladislas Sikorski.

The text of the agreement reads:

1. The government of the USSR recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity. The Polish government declares Poland is not bound by any agreement with any third power which is directed against the USSR.

2. Diplomatic relations will be restored between the two governments upon the signing of this agreement, and an immediate exchange of Ambassadors will be arranged.

3. The two governments mutually agree to render one to another aid and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.

4. The government of the USSR expresses its consent to the formation on territory of the USSR of a Polish Army under a commander appointed by the Polish government in agreement with the Soviet government, the Polish Army on territory of the USSR being subordinated in an operational sense to the Supreme Command of the USSR, in which the Polish Army will be represented. All details as to command, organization and employment of this force will be settled in a subsequent agreement.

5. This agreement will come into force immediately upon signature and without ratification. The present agreement is drawn up in two copies, in the Russian and Polish languages. Both texts have equal force.

The Soviet government grants amnesty to all Polish citizens now detained on Soviet territory either as prisoners of war or on other sufficient grounds, as from the resumption of diplomatic relations.

[Source: *New York Times*, July 31, 1941].

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

The commercial agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which was proclaimed on and became effective on August 6, 1937, and which was renewed for successive periods of one year on August 5, 1938, August 2, 1939, and August 6,

1940,¹ was continued in force for another year, that is, until August 6, 1942, by identic notes exchanged at Washington on August 2, 1941, by the Acting Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Sumner Welles, and the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Constantine Oumansky.

Although it is expected that in the coming year the character and amount of United States trade with the Soviet Union will be governed largely by the defense needs of the United States and of the Soviet Union and other countries struggling against the forces of armed aggression rather than by the usual commercial considerations, the exchange of notes will insure the continuance during the emergency period of our established commercial relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the 1937 commercial agreement.

The following table gives the value in dollars of exports to and imports from the Soviet Union in the agreement years:

(Source: Official records of the United States Department of Commerce.)

Agreement Year (beginning August)	U.S. domestic exports to U.S.S.R. (in thou- sands of U.S. dollars)	U.S. imports for consump- tion from U.S.S.R. (in thousands of U.S. dollars)
1935-36	33,286	21,200
1936-37	30,987	23,240
1937-38	64,338	22,874
1938-39	50,160	24,739
1939-40	73,636	24,773
1940-41 (10 months)*	57,481	22,710

* Preliminary data for the 10 months, August 1940 through May 1941.

The text of the identic notes exchanged follows:

"Washington, August 2, 1941.

"Excellency:

"In accordance with the conversations which have taken place, I have the honor to confirm on behalf of my Government the agreement which has been reached between the Governments of our respective countries that the agreement regarding commercial relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recorded in the exchange of notes of August 4, 1937,* between the Ambassador of the United States of America at Moscow and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

¹ Executive Agreement Series 105, 132, 151, and 179.

* Bulletin of August 10, 1940, p. 106.

which came into force on August 6, 1937, on the date of proclamation thereof by the President of the United States of America and approval thereof by the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and which was renewed on August 5, 1938, August 2, 1939, and August 6, 1940, shall continue in force until August 6, 1942.

"The present agreement shall be proclaimed by the President of the United States of America and approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"Accept (etc.)."

WELLES-OUNANSKY EXCHANGE OF NOTES

The Department of State made public on August 5, 1941 the following exchange of notes between the Acting Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Sumner Welles, and the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Constantine A. Oumansky:

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union

August 2, 1941

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I am pleased to inform you that the Government of the United States has decided to give all economic assistance practicable for the purpose of strengthening the Soviet Union in its struggle against armed aggression. This decision has been prompted by the conviction of the Government of the United States that the strengthening of the armed resistance of the Soviet Union to the predatory attack of an aggressor who is threatening the security and independence not only of the Soviet Union but also of all other nations is in the interest of the national defense of the United States.

In accordance with this decision of the Government of the United States and in order to implement the policy enunciated above, the Government of the United States is giving the most friendly consideration to requests from the Government, institutions, or agencies of the Soviet Union relative to the placing in this country of orders for articles and materials urgently required for the needs of the national defense of the Soviet Union and, for the purpose of promoting the speedy completion and delivery of such articles and materials, is extending to these orders priority assistance upon the principles applicable to the orders of countries struggling against aggression.

In order to facilitate the extension of economic assistance to the Soviet Union, the Department of State is also issuing unlimited licenses permitting the export to the Soviet Union of a wide variety of articles and materials needed for the strengthening of the defense of that coun-

try, in accordance with the principles applicable to the furnishing of such articles and materials as are needed for the same purpose by other countries resisting aggression.

The appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States, in pursuance of the decision to which I have above referred, are also giving their favorable consideration to requests for the extension of available American shipping facilities for the purpose of expediting the shipment to the Soviet Union of articles and materials needed for the national defense of that country.

I am (etc.)

SUMNER WELLES

The Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State

August 2, 1941

My dear Mr. Acting Secretary:

I am pleased to take notice of the contents of your communication of this date in which you informed me that the Government of the United States has decided to give all economic assistance practicable for the purpose of strengthening the Soviet Union in its struggle against armed aggression. You add that this decision has been prompted by the conviction of the Government of the United States that the strengthening of the armed resistance of the Soviet Union to the predatory attack of an aggressor who is threatening the security and independence not only of the Soviet Union but also of all other nations is in the interest of the national defense of the United States.

On behalf of my Government, I wish to emphasize the correctness of the view that the aggressor who has treacherously invaded my country is threatening the security and independence of all freedom loving nations and that this threat naturally creates a community of interest of national defense of those nations. My Government has directed me to express to the Government of the United States its gratitude for the friendly decision of the Government of the United States and its confidence that the economic assistance you refer to in your note will be of such scope and carried out with such expedition as to correspond to the magnitude of the military operations in which the Soviet Union is engaging, in offering armed resistance to the aggressor—a resistance which, as you so justly observed, is also in the interest of the national defense of the United States.

I am also pleased to note your statement that:

“In accordance with this decision of the Government of the United States and in order to implement the policy enunciated above, the Gov-

ernment of the United States is giving the most friendly consideration to requests from the Government, institutions, or agencies of the Soviet Union relative to the placing in this country of orders for articles and materials urgently required for the needs of the national defense of the Soviet Union and, for the purpose of promoting the speedy completion and delivery of such articles and materials, is extending to these orders priority assistance upon the principles applicable to the orders of countries struggling against aggression.

"In order to facilitate the extension of economic assistance to the Soviet Union, the Department of State is also issuing unlimited licenses permitting the export to the Soviet Union of a wide variety of articles and materials needed for the strengthening of the defense of that country, in accordance with the principles applicable to the furnishing of such articles and materials as are needed for the same purpose by other countries resisting aggression.

"The appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States, in pursuance of the decision to which I have above referred, are also giving their favorable consideration to requests for the extension of available American shipping facilities for the purpose of expediting the shipment to the Soviet Union of articles and materials needed for the national defense of that country."

I am (etc.)

CONSTANTINE A. OUMANSKY

[Source: *New York Times*, August 5, 1941].

TEXT OF MESSAGE TO STALIN

We have taken the opportunity afforded by the consideration of the report of Mr. Harry Hopkins on his return from Moscow to consult together as to how best our two countries can help your country in the splendid defense that you are making against the Nazi attack. We are at the moment cooperating to provide you with the very maximum of supplies that you most urgently need. Already many shiploads have left our shores and more will leave in the immediate future.

We must now turn our minds to the consideration of a more long-term policy, since there is still a long and hard path to be traversed before there can be won that complete victory without which our efforts and sacrifices would be wasted.

The war goes on upon many fronts and before it is over there may be further fighting fronts that will be developed. Our resources, though

immense, are limited, and it must become a question as to where and when those resources can best be used to further to the greatest extent our common effort. This applies equally to manufactured war supplies and to raw materials.

The needs and demands of your and our armed services can only be determined in the light of the full knowledge of the many factors which must be taken into consideration in the decisions that we make. In order that all of us may be in a position to arrive at speedy decisions as to the apportionment of our joint resources, we suggest that we prepare for a meeting to be held at Moscow, to which we would send high representatives who could discuss these matters directly with you. If this conference appeals to you, we want you to know that pending the decisions of that conference we shall continue to send supplies and materials as rapidly as possible.

We realize fully how vitally important to the defeat of Hitlerism is the brave and steadfast resistance of the Soviet Union, and we feel, therefore, that we must not in any circumstances fail to act quickly and immediately in this matter on planning the program for the future allocation of our joint resources.

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

(Signed) WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

[Source: *New York Times*, August 16, 1941].

DECREE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

On the Organization of the Organs of Political Propaganda and the Introduction of the Institution of Military Commissars into the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army:

The war which was thrust upon us has fundamentally changed the conditions of work in the Red Army. It has broadened the scope of political work in our Army and has made it imperative that our political workers do not limit their work to propaganda but take upon themselves responsibility for military work at the front as well.

On the other hand the war has also complicated the work of regiment and division commanders, and demands, therefore, that the political workers render all possible aid to the regiment and division commanders not only in the sphere of political work but in the sphere of the military as well.

All these new factors in the task of the political workers, connected

with the transition from peace to war time, call for increasing the role and the responsibility of the political workers, just as took place during the Civil War against foreign military intervention.

In connection with this, and in accordance with the wishes of the State Committee of Defense and the Chief Commands, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decrees:

1. To reorganize the administration and divisions of political propaganda into the *Political Administration* and *Political Divisions* of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army.

2. To introduce into all regiments and divisions, staffs, military schools and establishments of the Red Army, the institution of Military Commissars, and into companies, batteries and squadrons, the institution of Political Instructors.

3. To ratify the Order concerning military commissars in regiments and divisions of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army.

President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

M. KALININ,

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

A. GORKIN,

Moscow, Kremlin, July 16, 1941.

Ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The Order concerning the Military Commissars of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army:

1. The institution of military commissars is established in all regiments, divisions, staffs, military schools and institutions of the Red Army at the front as well as in the rear.

2. A military commissar is a representative of the Party and the Government in the Red Army, who equally with the commander carries full responsibility for the fulfillment of all military tasks by the fighting unit, for its steadfastness in combat and its unwavering readiness to fight to the last drop of blood against the enemy of our country and to defend honorably every inch of Soviet soil.

3. A military commissar is a moral leader of his unit (or larger body), the prime defender of its material and spiritual interests. "If a commander of a regiment represents the head of a regiment, then a commissar should be the father and the soul of his regiment." (Stalin).

4. A military commissar is obliged to render every conceivable aid to the commander who carries out honorably and unstintingly all fighting tasks, to strengthen his authority as a commander, and to exercise rigid control over the fulfillment of all orders issued by the high command.

5. A military commissar must issue a timely warning to the Supreme Command and the Government concerning commanders and political workers who are not worthy of the title of commander or political worker and who by their conduct deface the honor of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army.

6. It is the duty of the political commissar to inspire the troops in the struggle with the enemy of our country. In the critical moments of combat, the military commissar must raise, by personal example of courage and fearlessness, the fighting spirit of a military unit, as well as strive to achieve an unconditional fulfillment of the fighting order.

7. A military commissar must encourage and popularize the best fighters and commanders, cultivate in the personnel of the fighting unit courage, fearlessness, composure, initiative and sagacity, instil contempt for death and readiness to fight the enemy of our country to the victorious end.

8. A military commissar has to carry on, with the support of the wide masses of Red Army men and commanders, a ruthless struggle against cowards, panic-mongers and deserters, upholding with a firm hand revolutionary order and military discipline. Coordinating his work with the organs of the 3rd Administration of the People's Commissariat of Defense, a military commissar has to nip in the bud every attempt at treason.

9. A military commissar supervises the political organs, as well as the Party and Komsomol organizations, in the fighting units.

10. A political instructor is subordinate in his work to the commissar of the regiment, a commissar of the regiment to the commissar of a division, and a commissar of a division to the Military Council of the Army and to the Chief Political Administration of the Red Army.

11. All orders issued by the regiment, division, administration and institutions, are signed by the commander and the military commissar.

[Source: *Trud*, July 17, 1941].

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NEWS CHRONOLOGY

July 1 — September 15, 1941

Newspapers are named primarily for convenient reference, although the same items may appear in other newspapers. The date given is the date on which the event occurred, while the number in parenthesis following the name of the newspaper indicates the date of the paper in which the report appeared.

(N.Y.T.—New York Times; N.Y.H.T.—New York Herald Tribune; D.W.—Daily Worker; E.B.—Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R.)

* The texts of decrees, treaties, etc., referred to in the items marked with an asterisk are available in full at the office of the American Russian Institute.



INTERNAL AFFAIRS

ADMINISTRATION

July

- 15—Some Soviet government agencies reported in Washington to be moving from Moscow to Kazan. The Foreign Office is not moving, and the diplomatic corps is remaining in Moscow.—N.Y.T. (16)
- 15—Lozovsky informs the diplomatic corps that Soviet government will not leave Moscow.—N.Y.T. (16)
- 20—Stalin is appointed Defense Commissar and Timoshenko Vice-Commissar by the Presidium of Supreme Soviet.—N.Y.H.T. (20)
- 20—A United People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs supplants the former Internal Affairs and State Security Commissariats. Lavrenti Beria becomes Commissar.—N.Y.T. (21)
- 20—E. A. Shchadenko, 1st Rank Army Commissar; Gen. Y. N. Fedorenko, tank specialist; Gen. A. V. Khrulev and Aviation General P. F. Zhigarev are named Vice-Commissars of Defense, increasing total number to eleven.—N.Y.H.T. (22)
- 23—Soviet decree provides conditions

whereby stretcher-bearers may rate various Soviet decorations.—N.Y.H.T. (24)

- 23—Ivan Peresypkin, former Commissar of Communications, is named vice-Commissar of Defense.—N.Y.H.T. (24)
- 26—Lev Z. Mekhlis, former head of the Chief Political Administration of the Red Army, is reappointed to that post and is also named Vice-Commissar for Defense.—N.Y.T. (27)

September

- 8—Volga Germans to be moved beyond Urals because of failure to report on preparations for diversion being conducted by many among them.—N.Y.H.T. (8)
- 12—Major Generals Konev and Yeremenko promoted to the rank of Colonel General for leadership of successful offensive in Smolensk area; Major General Rokossovsky to Lieutenant General, and six others to Major General.—N.Y.H.T. (23)
- 13—Soviet press announces award of orders and medals to 58 among Civil Air Fleet personnel for war services.—E.B. (13)

ECONOMIC LIFE

July

- 16—Moscow rationing begins. Industrial worker gets 1 lb. 12 oz. of bread daily, and 3-1/3 lbs. of sugar and candy, 4 1/2 lbs. of meat, 4 lbs. 6 oz. of flour or macaroni, 1 lb. 12 oz. of butter, and 2 lbs. 3 oz. of fish monthly. White collar worker gets 1 lb. 5 oz. of bread daily, and 2 1/2 lbs. of meat, 2 1/2 lbs. of sugar and candy, 14 oz. of butter, 1 3/4 lbs. of fish, 3-1/3 lbs. of flour or macaroni monthly.—*N.Y.T.* (21)
- 17—Rationing is extended to Leningrad.—*N.Y.T.* (18)
- 18—Soviet school children form an organization to aid families of men at front. They care for younger children whose mothers have replaced husbands in factories, do housework, and tend gardens.—*N.Y.T.* (19)
- 20—The Soviet harvest is being completed nearly twice as quickly as last year. Thousands of women have replaced tractor and combine drivers who have gone into the army.—*N.Y.H.T.* (21)
- 20—4,100,000 hectares are harvested by July 10th, by comparison with 2,400,000 hectares by the same date last year.—*N.Y.H.T.* (21)
- 28—The wheat harvest in the Ukraine is reported within two weeks of completion, with grain being moved far eastward immediately upon harvesting.—*N.Y.T.* (28)
- 29—The Soviet press proposes a voluntary contribution of one day's pay to defense fund.—*N.Y.T.* (30)

August

- 3—Soviet oil fields reported ahead of scheduled production; idle wells being restored to service.—*N.Y.H.T.* (4)
- 6—Foreign correspondents find Stalin Auto Plant undamaged by air raids, operating with "extreme efficiency"

by Detroit standards, and a large number of women at skilled work.—*N.Y.T.* (7)

- 10—Soviet Interior Commissariat Chief of Fire Protection, Boris Korbeinikov, orders fire-fighting squads at all threshing floors, and prohibits building fires near cut or ripe grain.—*N.Y.T.* (11)
- 18—Millions reported to have given voluntary unpaid day's work for defense on Sunday, including 1,100,000 in Moscow alone.—*N.Y.T.* (19)
- 18—Most Ukraine crops believed gathered ahead of German advance, U. S. Department of Agriculture report states.—*N.Y.T.* (19)
- 19—Moscow reports that this year's grain crop will be 131,000,000 tons, with harvest in Zaporozhe oblast all in by August 1st.—*N.Y.H.T.* (20)
- 24—233 workers and engineers, including fourteen women, are decorated by Soviet for work in plants making planes and motors.—*N.Y.T.* (25)
- 30—Moscow announces that the reaping of winter grains was completed ahead of normal harvest time in the Ukraine, the Crimea, the North Caucasus and Kazakhstan.—*N.Y.T.* (30)

September

- 6—*Izvestia* announces plans to double Siberian coal output, mainly in Kuznetsk Basin.—*N.Y.T.* (7)
- 10—Alexei Shakhurin, Commissar of the Aviation Industry, receives title of "Hero of Socialist Labor," for "outstanding achievements in organization of serial production of warplanes of new types."—*N.Y.T.* (11)
- 10—Ukrainian Commissariat of Agriculture announces that the Republic's entire wheat harvest was in by September 1st, and the threshing half completed by same date.—*E.B.* (13)

DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS

July

- 3—Stalin broadcasts to the Soviet people on the war situation.—*N.Y.T.* (3)
- 2—General compulsory training of civilians for air raid and gas defense is ordered by the Committee of State Defense. The order applies to men between 16 and 60 and women from 18 to 50 years.—*N.Y.H.T.* (3)
- 6—Prison sentences are decreed for those convicted of spreading false rumors tending to alarm the Soviet population.—*N.Y.T.* (7)
- 7—Evacuation of children from Moscow is under way, although it was said officially there was no compulsion for them to leave.—*N.Y.T.* (8)
- 7—The Government of the Karelo-Finnish Republic decrees conscription of all male agricultural laborers from 16 to 60, and female from 16 to 55 for harvest work. Local Soviets were authorized to mobilize office workers for at least fifteen days, two to three hours daily, to aid in harvesting.—*N.Y.T.* (8)
- 7—The Japanese press reports passenger service on Trans-Siberian suspended, presumably because of military needs.—*N.Y.T.* (8)
- 7—Lozovsky announces formation of a People's Army "numbering millions" to reinforce Soviet fighting forces. No plans are being made for special women's fighting units, but women will fight in every capacity. Moscow is fully prepared for air raids, and will base its shelter system on subways.—*N.Y.H.T.* (8)
- 9—Fire watching round the clock begins in Moscow.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 16—The war commissar system is re-instituted in Red Army.—*N.Y.T.* (18)
- 20—Moscow is camouflaged against air raids.—*N.Y.H.T.* (21)
- 20—Re-institution of war commissars is

extended to the Red Navy.—*N.Y.T.* (21)

- 31—Marshall Budenny issues a manifesto urging Ukrainians to join the guerrilla bands.—*N.Y.T.* (Aug. 1)

August

- 6—Moscow fire-control head says defense organization is supported by youth organizations, and all fires are now **quenched within two to three hours**, as against eight hours after first raid.—*N.Y.T.* (7)
- 7—Military sources in Washington say that fifteen men, three deck, 130-ton tanks mounting flame-throwers, two 75 mm. anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns have been placed in service by Red Army.—*N.Y.H.T.* (8)
- 8—Official London quarters reported to regard performance of Soviet transport system as "little short of wonderful."—*N.Y.T.* (9)
- 8—Incendiary bombs set fire to three-million volume Academy of Sciences library in Moscow, but prompt action of attendants prevented loss of any books.—*N.Y.H.T.* (9)
- 15—Lozovsky describes Soviet tactics as directed toward exacting highest price for territory yielded plus avoidance of encirclement.—*N.Y.T.* (15)
- 17—Correspondents shown Moscow anti-aircraft battery are impressed by "surprising efficiency and excellence of equipment" not excelled by any seen in other countries.—*N.Y.T.* (18)
- 19—Faster, better-armed and higher-flying plane than any ever previously produced placed in operation by Red Air Force.—*N.Y.H.T.* (20)
- 21—Voroshilov appeals to people of Leningrad for last-ditch fight.—*N.Y.T.* (21)
- 22—Lieut. Gen. Mason MacFarlane, chief of British military mission to Moscow, reports at London on Soviet troops seen in action. Praises high morale,

efficiency, particularly excellent co-operation between air force and ground troops, rapid clearing of battlefield after action. Forced to spend night in car after heavy rainfall.—*N.Y.T.* (23)

22—Prof. Thomas of British mission, air defense expert, says few German planes reach Moscow, anti-aircraft fire very intense, searchlight crews efficient, Soviet claims of German raid losses borne out by British observers.—*N.Y.T.* (23)

24—Second Voroshilov proclamation calls upon Red Army and population to fulfill "holy duty" and "defend self-sacrificingly the path of the approaches to the city."—*N.Y.H.T.* (24)

September

- 3—Supreme Military Soviet of six, headed by Voroshilov and Zhdanov, named to rule Leningrad. 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. curfew introduced, sale of alcoholic beverages prohibited after 8 p.m., and all stores ordered to close by 9 p.m.
- 5—Eighth to tenth grade pupils in Soviet schools to receive extensive military training, including field practice.—*N.Y.T.* (6)

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

[The daily communiques are on file in the Institute library]

July

- 1—Soviet troops evacuate Lvov.—*N.Y.H.T.* (1)
- 8—Former Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov, in English broadcast, urges creation of Western military front.—*N.Y.T.* (8)
- 9—Istanbul reports that the Rumanian port of Constanta has been crippled.—*N.Y.H.T.* (10)
- 11—Soviet civil pilots are being used in the operation of Red Cross ambu-

lance and medical supply services to front.—*N.Y.H.T.* (12)

- 11—Marshals Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Budenny are placed in command of Northwestern, Western and South-western fronts.—*N.Y.T.* (12)
- 23—Lozovsky makes public captured German military documents indicating plans for chemical warfare.—*N.Y.T.* (24)
- 26—Rumania announces completion of reoccupation of Bessarabia and North Bukovina.—*N.Y.H.T.* (27)

August

- 4—Soviet planes dropping tabloid newspaper in German over enemy's lines, urging desertion to Soviet.—*N.Y.H.T.* (4)
- 4—It is reported that no bombs have fallen on Leningrad despite continuous attempted raids since outbreak of war.—*N.Y.H.T.* (5)
- 7—Finland reports Soviet has captured and fortified additional islands around Hango base.—*N.Y.T.* (9)
- 8—Soviet Air Force bombs Berlin for first time.—*N.Y.T.* (9)
- 8—Soviet summary of six weeks of war denies existence of "Stalin Line," says Germans have lost 1,500,000 men, 5,000 tanks, 8,000 pieces of artillery and 6,000 planes against 600,000, 5,000, 7,000 and 4,000 in the corresponding categories of the forces of the USSR.—*N.Y.H.T.* (8)
- 8—Berne reports new German timetable calling for capture of Leningrad and Moscow and an advance to the Caucasus by the end of September, then to establish line from Lake Ladoga to the Volga, and along the Volga to Astrakhan; this plan replacing original objective of seizure of Leningrad and occupation of Ukraine within several weeks of outbreak of war.—*N.Y.T.* (9)
- 9—Lozovsky says Soviet plans wide air raids in Reich, which are expected to

- have "immense effect" on morale.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 13—Moscow announces destruction of half-mile long Danube bridge carrying rail and pipe lines, which was only Rumanian connection to Black Sea ports.—*N.Y.H.T.* (14)
- 14—The Red Army announces loss of Pervomaisk and Kirovograd.—*N.Y.H.T.* (16)
- 14—Moscow announces evacuation of Smolensk.—*N.Y.T.* (14)
- 15—Official report from Soviet general at Smolensk front says Germans have been forced to abandon frontal attack on Moscow after thirty-day battle costing hundreds of thousands of casualties.—*N.Y.H.T.* (16)
- 18—Moscow announces withdrawal from Krivoi Rog and Nikolaev, stating that naval docks at latter city had been previously destroyed.—*N.Y.T.* (18)
- 21—Leading Berlin circles speaking of preparations for winter war.—*N.Y.T.* (22)
- 21—Red Army evacuates Gomel.—*N.Y.T.* (22)
- 23—Soviet estimates German losses for first two months of war as two million men, 8,000 tanks, 10,000 cannon, and 7,200 aircraft. Soviet losses were given as 700,000 men (150,000 dead, 440,000 wounded and 110,000 missing), 5,500 tanks, 7,500 cannon and 4,500 aircraft.—*N.Y.T.* (23)
- 26—Red Army evacuates Novgorod.—*N.Y.T.* (26)
- 27—Lozovsky says millions of leaflets in German, Finnish, Rumanian and Hungarian have been dropped, urging desertion to Soviet.—*N.Y.H.T.* (28)
- 28—Lozovsky announces destruction of Dnieper Dam.—*N.Y.T.* (29)
- 28—Soviet announces evacuation of Dnepropetrovsk.—*N.Y.T.* (29)
- 31—Soviet press, in comments on end of second year of war, expects "long, stubborn war requiring tremendous sacrifices—a war of attrition and exhaustion—but Hitlerite Germany will be smashed." (*Krasnaia Zvezda*)—*N.Y.T.* (Sept. 1)
- 31—An appeal by Budenny to German, Rumanian, Hungarian and Slovak armies on Ukraine front to revolt or surrender, is dropped over opposing lines.—*N.Y.T.* (Sept. 1)

September

- 2—Evacuation of Tallinn announced by Soviet.—*N.Y.T.* (3)
- 5—Timoshenko, in interview, expresses admiration for German coordination and communications, but says discipline is waning; says Soviet troops, originally at disadvantage due to inexperience in actual warfare, have become "inured." Insists that all Soviet arms, other than trench mortars, are superior to German, and that artillery is considerably better.—*N.Y.T.* (6)
- 10—Soviet press claims half of Rumanian Army has been destroyed thus far, largely before Odessa.—*N.Y.H.T.* (11)
- 12—*TASS* reports that 400 of 1,300 persons aboard hospital ship "Sibir" at time of sinking by German bombers in Finnish Gulf, were lost.—*N.Y.H.T.* (13)
- 13—Evacuation of Chernigov by Red Army announced.—*N.Y.T.* (13)
- 15—Kremenchug evacuated by Red Army.—*N.Y.T.* (15)

MISCELLANEOUS

July

- 11—Lozovsky announces that Father K. A. Floran, French Catholic priest in Leningrad, denounces Vichy and urges the French to fight with Britain and USSR against Germany.—*N.Y.H.T.* (12)
- 15—Soviet trans-Polar fliers, headed by

Gromov, denounce Lindbergh as pro-Fascist.—*N.Y.T.* (15)

August

- 4—A Moscow theatrical troupe leaves for front to entertain defenders of Smolensk.—*N.Y.T.* (5)
- 5—Divine aid invoked for the success of Russian armies at Greek Orthodox Church in Jerusalem.—*N.Y.T.* (6)
- 5—Andrei Kostikov, engineer, becomes "Hero of Socialist Labor" for invention hailed as weapon of the future, equal in importance to invention of gunpowder.—*N.Y.T.* (6)
- 10—Alexei Tolstoi calls for unity of Slav peoples against Hitler and denounces Pan-Slavism as reactionary, at Moscow conference of thirteen Slav nationalities.—*N.Y.T.* (11)
- 10—Thirty-one Orders of Lenin, 444 Orders of Red Banner are among honors granted to 1,207 Soviet war heroes.—*N.Y.T.* (11)
- 16—Stalin's son, Yakov Djugashvili, artillery lieutenant, cited for heroism in remaining at post until last shell had been used.—*N.Y.H.T.* (16)
- 17—Twenty-six Armenian leaders in USSR appeal to countrymen everywhere to support Soviet fight.—*N.Y.T.* (18)
- 24—Twenty-six leading Jews in USSR appeal to Jews of world for assistance in struggle to smash fascism.—*N.Y.T.* (24)
- 26—Pasha Angelina, outstanding tractor driver, appointed assistant commander of tractor unit in People's Army.—*N.Y.H.T.* (27)

September

- 12—Harvard scientists report Russian discovery of new comet on August 29, at observation post in Crimea, 150 miles from invading army.—*N.Y.T.* (13)
- 14—British radio reports first snow in Leningrad area.—*N.Y.H.T.* (14)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RELATIONS WITH ALLIES

July

- 1—It is announced from Canberra that the Minister of External Affairs of Australia stated that his government would welcome an appointment to the Russian Consulate vacant since 1908.—*N.Y.T.* (3)
- 5—In a speech at Leeds, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden promises that full military and economic aid will be extended to the Soviets and that no negotiations will be held with Hitler "at any time on any subject."—*N.Y.T.* (6)
- 7—Four oil experts arrive in Moscow from London to join the British economic mission.—*N.Y.T.* (8)
- 7—Two air raid defense experts, two army, one air force and two navy officers arrive in Moscow to join British military mission.—*N.Y.T.* (8)
- 7—Soviet-Polish talks begin.—*N.Y.H.T.* (8)
- 7—Ambassador Maisky says that the battle in progress will provide the turning point of the war, "on which depends the future of the world."—*N.Y.T.* (8)
- 8—A Soviet military mission is welcomed by London crowds. The mission, headed by Lieut. Gen. R. Golikov, deputy chief of General Staff, includes Rear Admiral N. M. Kharlamov, Col. Pugachev, Col. Dragun, Major Sizov, and military engineer Varanov.—*N.Y.T.* (9)
- 8—Sir Stafford Cripps sees Stalin.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 9—The Soviet military mission sees Eden, Dill, and Margessen.—*N.Y.H.T.* (10)
- 9—The British Ministry of Economic Warfare announces that Britain has completed arrangements for supply-

- ing large quantities of war materials to the Soviet Union and that some military equipment is already in transit.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 11—Lozovsky says he hopes occupation of Iceland is not an isolated step but one of a series of blows to Hitler.—*D.W.* (12)
- 13—Clement R. Atlee, Lord Privy Seal, asserts the British will make no peace with Nazis.—*N.Y.T.* (14)
- 13—British-Soviet Pact pledging mutual assistance and no separate peace signed in Moscow.—*N.Y.T.* (14)*
- 15—Prime Minister Churchill says the USSR is British "ally" under new Pact.—*N.Y.T.* (16)
- 16—Maisky, Soviet Ambassador to Britain, says USSR will fight from beyond Urals, if necessary.—*N.Y.T.* (17)
- 17—Lozovsky states that the Soviet Union favors principle of restoration of full independence and freedom to Poland, Czechoslovakia and other lands taken by Germans.—*N.Y.T.* (18)
- 17—The Soviet Embassy in London announces accord with Czechoslovakia regarding exchange of diplomatic representatives and "common struggle against Hitlerite Germany."—*N.Y.H.T.* (18)
- 18—Dekanozov and Gavrilovitch, former Yugoslav envoy to Moscow, leave Ankara together by plane for Moscow.—*N.Y.T.* (19)
- 18—A Soviet-Czech Pact is signed in Moscow. It provides for the formation of Czech military units on Soviet soil under a Czech commander but subordinate to Soviet High Command.—*N.Y.T.* (19)*
- 19—Gavrilovitch arrives in Moscow to resume post as Yugoslav Minister.—*N.Y.H.T.* (20)
- 23—Lieut. Gen. Golikov returns to London after trip to Moscow to report on first talks.—*N.Y.H.T.* (24)
- 25—London hears of Soviet dissatisfaction with the extent of British material aid to USSR.—*N.Y.H.T.* (25)
- 26—London reports exchange of letters between Stalin and Churchill, in which the former asked for additional aid, including military action other than air raids, and the latter replied that extent of British aid to Soviet depends on American aid to Britain.—*N.Y.H.T.* (27)
- 29—Finland breaks diplomatic relations with Britain.—*N.Y.T.* (29)
- 30—Soviet-Polish treaty signed in London restoring diplomatic relations, nullifying the Soviet-German territorial agreements regarding Poland and Polish agreements regarding the USSR. It provides for formation of Polish Army on Soviet territory, and amnesty to Polish nationals.—*N.Y.T.* (31)*
- 31—The British bomb Petsamo in first belligerent act against Finland.—*N.Y.H.T.* (Aug. 1)
- August*
- 2—Britain declares all goods destined for Finland are liable to seizure, and all commercial and financial transactions are broken off.—*N.Y.T.* (3)
- 3—*Izvestia* objects to a statement by Gen. Sikorski that the 1939 boundaries of Polish state cannot be questioned. Asserts German attack proves foresight in occupying Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.—*N.Y.H.T.* (4)
- 5—Diplomatic relations are resumed between USSR and Norwegian Government in Exile.—*N.Y.T.* (6)
- 5—The House of Commons is told British supplies are already on way to USSR.—*N.Y.H.T.* (6)
- 6—Gen. Wladislas Anders appointed chief of Polish Army being formed in USSR. Gen. Sigismond Syzysko-Bohusz appointed chief of military

- mission to Moscow. Gen. Silvestr Blaha, chief of Czech mission, is in Moscow organizing Czech units under the recent Soviet-Czech agreement.—*N.Y.T.* (7)
- 6—Atlee announces British and Soviet fleets in northern waters are “in contact” and operating jointly against Germany.—*N.Y.H.T.* (7)
- 6—British air defense expert returning from Moscow describes its defenses. Says four layers of anti-aircraft fire, hundreds of fighters, including many piloted by women, make capital almost impregnable.—*N.Y.H.T.* (7)
- 9—London releases Polish manifesto asserting that 2,000 groups are conducting continuous sabotage and guerrilla warfare.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 10—Masaryk announces that the Czech formation under Red Army will number at least a full brigade.—*N.Y.T.* (11)
- 11—Polish social welfare mission going to Moscow to aid former prisoners.—*N.Y.T.* (12)
- 13—Czech Minister, Zdenek Fierlinger, arrives in Moscow.—*N.Y.T.* (14)
- 13—The USSR announces that all Polish prisoners have been granted amnesty.—*N.Y.T.* (13)
- 14—Roosevelt and Churchill, after meeting at sea, announce eight-point war aims.—*N.Y.H.T.* (15)
- 16—British-Soviet trade agreement signed in Moscow. It was announced in the following Soviet-British communique:
- “On August 16, 1941, the signature took place at Moscow of an agreement on turnover of goods, on credit and on clearing between the USSR and England.
- “The agreement provides for the supply of considerable quantities of British goods to the USSR as well as for the supply of certain Soviet goods to England.
- “Under the agreement England grants to the USSR a credit of ten million pounds for payment for goods at the rate of 3 per cent per annum for a mean period of five years. When the said amount of credit has almost expired the governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of increasing the amount of credit. Payments between the parties are regulated on a clearing basis.”—*N.Y.T.* (18)
- 16—Polish Ambassador at Washington visits Soviet Embassy, reestablishing diplomatic contact.—*N.Y.T.* (17)
- 21—Mobilization of Polish Army on Soviet soil begins. Two divisions and one reserve regiment to be formed forthwith. Gen. Anders reports USSR loyally and painstakingly executing provisions of Soviet-Polish military convention.—*N.Y.T.* (22)
- 24—Churchill, in radio address, says “Russians fight with magnificent devotion. Not only that, our generals who have visited the Russian front line report with admiration the efficiency of their military organization and the excellence of their equipment.”—*N.Y.T.* (25)
- 24—New Zealand Prime Minister Nash says Soviet is giving Empire precious respite, but that false sense of security should not result.—*N.Y.T.* (25)
- 25—Britain, Australia and USSR reported discussing use of Soviet ships to assist in shipping from Australia to Britain.—*N.Y.T.* (25)
- 26—Prof. Casimir Bartel, Premier of Poland under Pilsudski and said to have been chairman of Lvov Municipal Council under Soviets, reported shot by Gestapo, according to Polish Government at London.—*N.Y.T.* (27)

September

- 2—British Trades Union Congress votes organization of Anglo-Russian Trade

- Union Council. Delegate charges member of British cabinet, Moore-Brabazon, with expressing hope that German and Red armies would exterminate each other.—*N.Y.H.T.* (3)
- 3—British Ambassador Cripps, in letter to *Izvestia* on second anniversary of war, says Soviet resistance has saved Britain and U.S., and assures USSR of all possible aid.—*N.Y.H.T.* (4)
- 3—Lord Beaverbrook to head British mission to Moscow.—*N.Y.T.* (4)
- 5—C. D. Howe, Minister of Munitions, announces in Ottawa that Canada will soon be turning out war materials for the USSR.—*N.Y.T.* (6)
- 6—British Major General Sir John Duncan urges opening of second front in Europe or Africa to relieve Red Army.—*N.Y.T.* (7)
- 6—Kingsley Wood, British Chancellor of Exchequer, says there will be no limit on financial assistance to USSR.—*N.Y.H.T.* (7)
- 7—British Catholic, Anglican and Jewish prelates lead nation-wide prayers for Red Army.—*N.Y.H.T.* (8)
- 7—A technical agreement between the Bank of England and the State Bank of the Soviet Union, implementing the Anglo-Soviet trade pact and regulating the mode of payment and exchange, is signed in Moscow.—*N.Y.T.* (8)
- 9—A majority of the officers and attachés of the United States and British Embassies, who took up residence in Kazan in mid-July, return to Moscow.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 9—Britain reports sinking German vessels off Murmansk.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 11—Churchill denies that Aircraft Minister Moore-Brabazon is foe of USSR. Says hundreds of British fighter aircraft are being sent.—*N.Y.T.* (11)
- 11—Two thousand Russian miners removed from Spitzbergen by British-Canadian landing force.—*N.Y.H.T.* (11)
- 13—Australia to send wool, lead and zinc concentrates to Soviet.—*N.Y.H.T.* (14)
- 13—*London Sunday Times* estimates \$60,000,000 worth of British and American goods has already reached USSR.—*D.W.* (14)
- 14—R.A.F. wing, complete with planes, pilots and ground crews, arrives in USSR.—*N.Y.T.* (15)

NEUTRALS

June

- 30—Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, Vinogradov, returns to Ankara.—*N.Y.T.* (July 1)

July

- 6—The first Soviet ship to call in Buenos Aires in twenty years sails for Vladivostok with a cargo of wool, leather, hides and skins valued at \$4,500,000.—*N.Y.T.* (7)
- 16—The Turkish Government is reported to have rejected a German request for troop transit rights as "prematuring."—*N.Y.T.* (17)
- 25—Lozovsky shows correspondents captured German documents indicating planned surprise attack on Turkey, and says Turkish Government is being informed.—*N.Y.T.* (26)
- 27—Ankara reports that a scheduled visit to Turkey by Dr. Clodius, German economic negotiator, has been postponed indefinitely because of slowness of German drive in USSR.—*N.Y.H.T.* (28)
- 28—Ankara reports that Stalin has sent a letter to Ismet Inonu disclaiming designs on Dardanelles.—*N.Y.T.* (29)
- 28—Vyshinsky, Vice Foreign Commissar, denies Bulgarian claims of Soviet parachute landings, and accuses Germany of having engineered the incident as a provocation.—*N.Y.T.* (29)

- 31—Ankara reports large-scale German troop movements into Bulgaria.—*N.Y.T.* (Aug. 1)

August

- 1—Rumania tells Turkey no oil is available for sale.—*N.Y.T.* (2)
- 4—Turkish press objects to London *Times* editorial stating that Russian influence should be dominant in Eastern Europe after the war.—*N.Y.T.* (5)
- 5—British Minister to Kabul has protested against marked increase in Germans in Afghanistan, according to Ankara reports.—*N.Y.T.* (6)
- 5—Ankara reports assurance by British Ambassador that no agreement would be entered into with USSR on post-war spheres of influence which would infringe on Turkish interests.—*N.Y.T.* (7)
- 6—The Swedish Government says that passage of German planes, warships, supplies and wounded over its territory and waters is in accordance with international law.—*N.Y.T.* (7)
- 8—TASS denies reports of Soviet-British treaty providing for recognition of Russian claims for control of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and calls them "German-inspired."—*N.Y.T.* (9)
- 10—It is reported that German trade delegation to Turkey has temporarily given up efforts to secure virtual monopoly of Turkish foreign trade, which had been based on Turkish fear of isolation in event of German victory against USSR.—*N.Y.H.T.* (12)
- 10—Britain and the USSR make formal statement of attitude toward Turkey, denying aggressive intentions, and promise "every help and assistance" in event of attack. The Soviet declaration reads: "As late as March, 1941, the Soviet government exchanged assurances with the Turkish government in connection with reports that were then being spread to the effect that if Turkey were compelled to enter the war the Soviet Union would take advantage of Turkey's difficulties to attack her."
"It will be recalled that the Soviet government considered it necessary at the time to declare that such reports in no way corresponded to the attitude of the Soviet Union, and if Turkey were in fact attacked and compelled to enter the war for the defense of her territory, she could count on full understanding and neutrality of the Soviet Union, on the basis of the non-aggression pact between the two countries."—*N.Y.H.T.* (13)
- 14—Turkey refuses Italian war vessel passage into Black Sea.—*N.Y.H.T.* (15)
- 15—After request for transit of war materials is refused, Germans are reported seeking Turkish permission to ship food through Turkey to Soviet border, if they reach that area. Turkey permits Italian naval tanker to proceed through Dardanelles for oil, in second exception to treaty regulations.—*N.Y.T.* (17)
- 16—Soviet Ambassador to Sofia rejects as unfounded Bulgarian protest against alleged bombing of Bulgaria. Says if bombing occurred, it was German provocation.—*N.Y.T.* (17)
- 20—Ankara reports two additional divisions of fresh German troops entering Bulgaria. Italians scouting Greco-Turkish frontier.—*N.Y.H.T.* (20)
- 23—Chilean government is considering the reestablishment of commercial relations with the USSR. Representatives of Soviet commercial organizations are in Chile.—*N.Y.T.* (24)
- 25—Turkey informs Britain and USSR of intention to remain neutral regarding Iran, after rejection of mediation offer by Iran.—*N.Y.T.* (26)

26—TASS reports more than 10,000 German troops, mainly parachutists, at Salonika, others at Greek islands off Turkish coast, also arrival of German admiral at Sofia to take command of vessels and barges on Varna River.—*N.Y.H.T.* (27)

27—*Pravda* says Germans had promised to erect greater Armenian state out of Armenian SSR and Armenian sections of Turkey and Iran, if Armenians would organize army to fight Soviet.—*N.Y.T.* (28)

30—Sweden officially announces that two months of German recruiting have resulted in ten volunteers to fight the USSR, of which two returned when they learned that they were to fight in the Ukraine, and not in Finland, as they had believed.—*N.Y.T.* (31)

September

4—Grand Admiral Raeder, German naval Commander in Chief, is in Bulgaria, which is reported to have agreed to military cooperation with Germany against any nation other than the USSR.—*N.Y.T.* (5)

6—Germany massing parachutists, torpedo boats and submarines at Bulgarian ports for attack on Baku and Iran supply line, according to Ankara reports.—*N.Y.H.T.* (7)

9—Clodius, German trade expert, arrives in Turkey and proposes pact amounting to German monopoly of Turkish foreign trade.—*N.Y.T.* (10)

10—Molotov note to Bulgaria charges Axis is being permitted to establish bases for spread of war to East on Bulgarian territory.—*N.Y.T.* (11)

10—Turkey rejects German demand that Italian fleet be permitted to pass through Dardanelles to aid in attack on Odessa.—*N.Y.T.* (11)

12—Soviet press continues to warn Bulgaria against stirring up sympathy for "crusade" against USSR.—*N.Y.T.* (13)

UNITED STATES

July

1—Sumner Welles in a press conference reveals that Soviet Ambassador Oumansky has applied for material aid from the United States for his country.—*N.Y.H.T.* (2)

2—Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs Lozovsky thanks the United States for its stand on the Soviet-German conflict.—*N.Y.T.* (3)

4—Moscow radios July 4th greetings to the United States.—*N.Y.H.T.* (4)

5—The United States refuses to take over Soviet representation in Vichy and French representation in Moscow on the grounds that U. S. Embassies are already overtaxed.—*N.Y.T.* (6)

3—Soviet freighter leaves Los Angeles with 80,000 bbls. of gasoline.—*N.Y.H.T.* (8)

7—Ambassador Oumansky and Amtorg officials see Welles about supplies.—*N.Y.H.T.* (9)

8—Welles says discussions with Oumansky have been paving way for decision for placing orders for materials. The question of lease-lend aid has not been raised for discussion. Other officials state that orders for machine tools and other non-military materials, previously held up under license system, have been released.—*N.Y.T.* (9)

9—Ambassador Steinhardt sees Molotov, Vyshinsky and Lozovsky. He also calls on British Ambassador Cripps.—*N.Y.T.* (10)

9—Soviet authorities agree to release from Russian citizenship the wives of five American citizens and to permit their departure to the United States.—*N.Y.T.* (10)

9—Washington hears that five 5,000 ton Soviet freighters are in American ports, with others on the way.—*N.Y.T.* (10)

- 10—Ambassador Oumansky sees President Roosevelt. He says the American government knows the specific Soviet needs for supplies, and that he is "deeply impressed by the friendly and far-sighted approach" of the President.—*N.Y.T.* (11)
- 11—President Roosevelt's reply to Kalinin's Independence Day greeting states that the American people "are bound with strong ties of historic friendship to the Russian people. It is, therefore, only natural that they are observing with sympathy and admiration the valiant struggle which the Russian people are waging at the present time in self-defense."—*N.Y.T.* (12)
- 14—Ambassador Oumansky sees Under Secretary Welles for the third time since outbreak of war. He announces publication of Embassy news bulletin.—*N.Y.H.T.* (15)
- 15—Export licenses for \$1,700,000 worth of machinery are issued to Amtorg, according to New York reports. Eleven Soviet ships are reported to be in American harbors to load these cargoes.—*N.Y.T.* (16)
- 18—The junior personnel of the American Embassy in Moscow leave for Kazan.—*N.Y.T.* (19)
- 20—War risk insurance rates on cargoes to USSR lowered.—*N.Y.T.* (20)
- 22—Jesse Jones discloses an American offer to purchase manganese, chrome and other strategic raw materials from USSR to offset purchases here.—*N.Y.T.* (23)
- 26—A Soviet military mission to U. S. arrives and confers with Under Secretary Welles and Army Chief of Staff General Marshall. The mission consists of Lieut. Gen. Filip Ivanovich Golikov and Maj. Gen. Alexander Repin.—*N.Y.H.T.* (27)
- 28—The Soviet military mission sees Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, on aid. Welles says mission's

purpose was coordination and placing of orders for military supplies.—*N.Y.T.* (29)

- 30—Harry Hopkins arrives in Moscow. He sees Stalin in the presence of Steinhardt and Molotov. He pledges supplies and receives a personal note from Stalin to Roosevelt.—*N.Y.T.* (31)
- 31—Ickes as Oil Coordinator asks priority on manufacture of oil drums for USSR.—*Washington Times* (31)
- 31—Ambassador Oumansky, Golikov and Repin see President Roosevelt. Hopkins sees Stalin again. He expresses amazement at insignificant bombing damage. Lozovsky says visits again demonstrates U. S. determination to aid nations struggling for independence against Fascism.—*N.Y.T.* (Aug. 1)

August

- 1—President Roosevelt terms the Red Army fight "magnificent."—*N.Y.T.* (2)
- 1—President Roosevelt orders an embargo on shipments of aviation gasoline and oils to points outside the Western Hemisphere, the British Empire and unoccupied territories of nations resisting aggression.—*N.Y.T.* (2)
- 2—U. S. and USSR extend trade agreement. U. S. formally pledges weapons and supplies to USSR and promises consideration of assignment of American shipping; USSR urges haste and quantity in exchange of notes between Welles and Oumansky.—*N.Y.T.*

× (5)*

- 2—The Aluminum Company of America announces sale of two million lbs. of aluminum to USSR completed but for OPM approval.—*N.Y.H.T.* (3)
- 2—Hopkins leaves Moscow. Lozovsky, Steinhardt and Cripps see him off.—*N.Y.H.T.* (3)
- 2—It is reported that Amtorg will be

- granted whatever export licenses are necessary on Soviet purchases here. Machine tools are described as being most urgently needed.—*N.Y.T.* (3)
- 4—Hopkins returns to London from Moscow trip.—*N.Y.T.* (4)
- 6—Treasury Department unfreezes Soviet orders pending at time of outbreak of war. Orders reported to total \$50,000,000, primarily machine tools, oil well drilling machinery and other industrial equipment.—*N.Y.T.* (7)
- 6—U. S. amends license system for Axis and Chinese nationals to unfreeze assets of those doing business with Allies.—*N.Y.H.T.* (7))
- 7—Secretary Ickes announces that first shipment of aviation gas is on way to USSR in a Soviet tanker, and four American tankers will be used for additional shipments.—*N.Y.T.* (8)
- 7—*Prauda* and *Izvestia* editorials, and Lozovsky in a statement, hail American pledges of economic assistance.—*N.Y.H.T.* (8)
- 9—The actual transfer of American military planes and equipment to the Soviet Union is being held up pending Roosevelt's return from Atlantic cruise. Negotiations with British on release to USSR of materials which former had ordered reported in progress.—*N.Y.T.* (12)
- 9—It is reported from Washington that several hundred fighter planes ordered by Britain have been diverted, and are en route to the USSR. Arrangements are almost completed for shipment of medium bombers, which will be flown via Alaska. The entire transaction is on cash basis.—*N.Y.H.T.* (10)
- 11—Joseph E. Davies, former Ambassador to Moscow, says invasion of USSR is "beginning of the end" for Hitler.—*N.Y.H.T.* (12)
- 14—Ickes announces sailing of first of American tankers assigned to carry aviation gasoline to USSR, also sailing of another Soviet vessel. Remaining three American tankers to sail shortly. Reports placing orders for 60,000 55-gallon drums for future shipments.—*N.Y.T.* (15)
- 15—Roosevelt and Churchill promise full aid to USSR in letter to Stalin; propose Moscow conference on supply problems. For text, see page——.—*N.Y.H.T.* (16)*
- 16—Stalin informs British and American Ambassadors that he is ready to "take all necessary steps" to arrange Moscow conference.—*N.Y.H.T.* (16)
- 18—Roosevelt tells Congressional leaders that Soviet resistance has probably precluded invasion of Britain this year, and transmits approvingly British view that final victory will require invasion of continent.—*N.Y.T.* (19)
- 18—Oumansky and Golikov see Knudsen of OPM on supply problems.—*N.Y.T.* (19)
- 19—New York mail now arrives in Moscow in six weeks.—*N.Y.T.* (19)
- 19—Justice Murphy supports aid to the USSR in speech before Knights of Columbus.—*N.Y.T.* (20)
- 19—Lozovsky says Stalin informed Steinhart and Cripps that USSR is ready for Moscow conference at earliest possible moment.—*N.Y.T.* (20)
- 19—Edward C. Carter announces organization, with approval of President's Committee on War Relief Agencies and of Soviet Embassy, of million-dollar drive to provide medical aid to USSR.—*N.Y.T.* (20)
- 19—Roosevelt says war production will be stepped up further to meet needs of USSR and China, in addition to Britain.—*N.Y.H.T.* (20)
- 19—Commerce Department reports im-

- ports of \$3,407,285 of gold from USSR in week ended August 13th.—*N.Y.H.T.* (20)
- 20—Jesse Jones says U. S. will find way of helping USSR if credit is needed.—*N.Y.T.* (21)
- 20—In Washington Hopkins is reported to feel that German efforts to raise Fifth Column in the Soviet Union have failed; that Soviet communications with armies remain unbroken despite greatest Nazi efforts, and that German seizure of Ukraine west of Dnieper will not prevent Soviet organization for long war, provided America and Britain supply necessary help.—*N.Y.T.* (21)
- 21—American Federation of Polish Jews announces that it is again possible for American Jews to aid relatives in Soviet Union.—*N.Y.T.* (21)
- 21—Anthony Dimond, Alaskan delegate to Congress, proposes that U. S. ask USSR for military and naval rights in Soviet North Pacific islands to close Northern Pacific to Japan.—*N.Y.T.* (22)
- 22—Diplomatic advices to London report Soviet dissatisfaction with quantity of aid received. Failure of Britain to relinquish priorities on U.S.-built armaments a factor, as is hesitation in opening western front. Few dozen planes reported received from U. S., as against thousand reported asked for.—*N.Y.T.* (23)
- 22—It is reported in Washington that the Soviets desire to purchase more than a billion dollars worth of supplies in U. S. Some fighter planes sent, no medium bombers as yet. Efforts are being made to meet a tenth of Soviet requests within coming weeks.—*N.Y.T.* (23)
- 25—General licenses being issued for the export of strategic minerals from the Philippines to the USSR.—*N.Y.H.T.* (26)
- 27—Philippine High Commissioner Sayre's office says that although coconut oil and hemp are available for export to USSR, no licenses have been requested, no ships have been requested, and previous statement to contrary grew out of misunderstanding.—*N.Y.H.T.* (28)
- 29—Averell Harriman appointed head of U. S. mission to Moscow conference.—*N.Y.T.* (30)
- 31—Forty-seven Russians with diplomatic passports arrive at Nome in two Soviet flying boats after four-day trip from Moscow.—*N.Y.T.* (Sept. 1)
- September*
- 2—Soviet mission which arrived in Alaska by air identified as consisting of air experts here to visit American plants and select types of aircraft best suited to Soviet needs.—*N.Y.T.* (3)
- 2—Soviet officials negotiating with Consolidated Aircraft for purchase of long-distance bombers.—*N.Y.T.* (3)
- 2—London hears first American planes have arrived in USSR.—*N.Y.H.T.* (3)
- 3—Washington announces composition of aid and supply mission to Moscow. Headed by W. Averell Harriman, it also includes Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, Admiral William Harrison Standley, and William L. Bett of OPM.—*N.Y.H.T.* (3)
- 4—First American tanker reaches Vladivostok.—*N.Y.T.* (5)
- 6—Washington reports aid to USSR will be greatly increased, particularly in items such as aluminum, of which Soviet producing capacity is said to have been greatly reduced.—*N.Y.H.T.* (7)
- 6—2,500,000 lbs. of aluminum, originally destined for France, reported sold to Amtorg by Reynolds Metal Co.—*N.Y.T.* (7)

- 6—Soviet air mission in conference with Brig. Gen. Brooks, commander of 2nd Air Force, who calls them most businesslike of all missions he has met.—*N.Y.H.T.* (7)
- 9—Gromov arrives in Washington for conference with government officials on technical needs.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 11—Oumansky sees Roosevelt and Hull on aid; is reported to have urged greater speed.—*N.Y.T.* (12)
- 12—Roosevelt sees Harriman mission on aid allocation.—*N.Y.T.* (13)
- 12—Lozovsky hails Roosevelt speech of September 11 as "serious blow" to German ambitions.—*N.Y.T.* (13)
- 12—It is reported that American technicians will accompany American planes sent to USSR for instruction purposes.—*N.Y.H.T.* (13)
- 12—Oumansky and Soviet air mission of 47 see President Roosevelt.—*N.Y.H.T.* (13)
- 12—A Red Cross mission headed by Allen Wardwell is to visit USSR and investigate relief needs.—*D.W.* (13)
- 13—London hears that American-manned ferry service may move U. S. planes to USSR.—*N.Y.H.T.* (14)
- 13—Harriman says opening of Persian Gulf route gives important point of entry for American supplies. Says Soviet will get aid until victory.—*D.W.* (14)
- the sale of Kamchatka and Far East to U. S. which he charges are intended to provoke difficulties between Japan and USSR.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 10—Sumner Welles denies Japanese reports of American attempts to secure bases in Siberia.—*N.Y.T.* (11)
- 12—Soviet Ambassador Smetanin sees Yosuke Matsuoka despite latter's illness.—*N.Y.H.T.* (12)
- 16—Japanese cabinet resigns due to failure of foreign policy. Matsuoka not to be in new cabinet.—*N.Y.T.* (17)
- 18—A Tokyo newspaper reports a Japanese protest to USSR against Soviet naming of danger zones in the Japan Sea and off Kamchatka. Ambassador Smetanin visits the Japanese Foreign Office.—*N.Y.T.* (19)
- 24—Roosevelt says oil sales to Japan have been for the purpose of preventing spread of war to South Pacific.—*N.Y.T.* (25)
- 26—Japan freezes all British and American assets.—*N.Y.T.* (27)
- 26—Britain cancels all trade pacts with Japan.—*N.Y.H.T.* (26)
- 26—U. S. freezes Japan's assets. Restricts oil and cotton, curbs silk trade.—*N.Y.H.T.* (26)
- 30—Shanghai reports Japanese troops in Manchukuo are being reinforced.—*N.Y.T.* (31)

FAR EAST

- 6—It is reported from Chungking that the Soviet Union has assured the Chinese Government that it will continue to send military supplies in spite of hostilities with Germany.—*N.Y.T.* (7)
- 8—North China foreign trade with Germany is crippled by German-Soviet war due to elimination of Trans-Siberian carrier.—*N.Y.H.T.* (27)
- 9—Lozovsky denies German reports of the sale of Kamchatka and Far East to U. S. which he charges are intended to provoke difficulties between Japan and USSR.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 5—Chungking reports Soviet pilots, planes, artillery, gasoline and munitions en route to China.—*N.Y.T.* (6)
- 5—Lozovsky denies reports of Soviet-Japanese border tension, and of alleged Soviet-Chinese conference in Chita.—*N.Y.T.* (6)
- 5—Soviet Ambassador Smetanin confers with Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda.—*N.Y.H.T.* (6)
- 8—Japan orders its civilians to evacuate

wide strip of Manchuokuo border.—*N.Y.H.T.* (9)

9—Moscow and Tokyo deny reports of border clashes and Japanese demands on Soviet. Lozovsky also denies stories of Soviet promises of Pacific bases to U. S., and expresses surprise that serious newspapers should circulate such "wild tales."—*N.Y.T.* (10)

12—Japanese Foreign Office "urgently concerned" over shipments of American supplies to USSR through Vladivostok, whether on American or other vessels.—*N.Y.H.T.* (12)

12—Japanese Army spokesman fears conversion of Vladivostok into "America's first line of defense against Japan." Questions whether supplies sent there will actually be forwarded to European front.—*N.Y.T.* (13)

20—Joint commission to fix Mongol People's Republic—Manchuokuo frontier "successfully and fully completed work" on August 15th, according to Moscow announcement.—*N.Y.T.* (20)

27—Molotov, in reply to Japanese note, "sees no reason for anxiety on part of Japan" regarding American shipments to USSR via "usual trade routes, including Soviet Far Eastern ports."—*N.Y.H.T.* (27)

27—Hull asserts U. S. will insist upon freedom of seas in Pacific, in reply to request for statement of position on Japanese protests regarding Soviet war materials shipments through Vladivostok.—*N.Y.T.* (28)

27—TASS again denies reports that Soviet-Chinese meetings at Chita discussed matters beyond the final stabilization of the Manchurian border.—*N.Y.T.* (28)

ENEMIES

June

29—It is reported from Ankara that eight or nine Italian divisions have joined

the German forces fighting the Soviet Union.—*N.Y.H.T.* (July 1)

30—The Vichy Government severs diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.—*N.Y.H.T.* (July 1)

July

2—The Soviet Embassy staff leaves Berlin.—*N.Y.T.* (3)

6—TASS reports local Rumanian uprisings against the Germans because of food seizures.—*N.Y.T.* (7)

7—The Russian Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations send protests to the International Red Cross against "repeated bombings of sanitary units of the organizations by the Germans." Hospitals at Grodno, Lida, Smolensk and Minsk, and a hospital train at Lvov, had been attacked between June 26th and 28th.—*N.Y.T.* (8)

8—Vichy announces that 10,003 of the 10,707 Russians rounded up after the French-Russian diplomatic break had been released.—*N.Y.T.* (9)

10—Mannerheim declares Finland's aim is conquest of all Karelia, including the area which was part of the Soviet Union before Finnish-Soviet war.—*N.Y.T.* (11)

10—Finland publishes Blue-White Book on Soviet-Finnish relations since March, 1940, charging Soviet pressure on the Finnish government and border violations.—*N.Y.T.* (11)

13—Attack upon USSR cost Germany trade with Soviet ten times higher than in 1938, according to Reich Minister of Economics Fund.—*N.Y.T.* (14)

13—German Ambassador to the USSR and 200 of the staff reach Turkey.—*N.Y.S.* (14)

14—Berlin announces exchange of Soviet and German missions, but says 50 Russians are being held until like number of Germans, still missing, are turned over.—*N.Y.T.* (15)

- 14—The Soviet Union denies a German request for recognition of several large vessels in Baltic and Arctic as hospital ships, on ground of German perfidy.—*N.Y.T.* (14)
 - 15—Rumanian Vice Premier announces that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina will be administered separately until the last traces of bolshevism have been exterminated.—*N.Y.T.* (16)
 - 16—The Soviet Ambassador to Berlin arrives in Ankara with a party of 1,500 on their way back to the USSR.—*N.Y.T.* (17)
 - 18—Ankara reports that the Soviet Embassy staff in Rumania went on a three-day hunger strike to enforce diplomatic treatment while being removed from Rumania.—*N.Y.H.T.* (19)
 - 20—Catholic priests sent by Rome as missionaries in Soviet territory occupied by invading armies arrive in Hungary and Rumania.—*N.Y.H.T.* (2)
 - 22—It is reported from Berlin that Alfred Rosenberg will be Reich administrator of conquered Soviet territories.—*N.Y.H.T.* (23)
 - 22—Berlin reports dropping leaflets urging Russians to surrender, and promising good treatment.—*N.Y.H.T.* (23)
 - 23—Virginio Gayda warns against hopes for quick victory.—*N.Y.T.* (24)
 - 25—Moscow reports Slovak uprising against grain requisitions.—*N.Y.T.* (26)
 - 27—Lozovsky says German troop withdrawals from Africa to bolster Eastern Front are causing friction with Italy.—*N.Y.T.* (28)
 - 28—The Soviet government has asked Sweden to intervene with Finland to permit departure of Russian diplomats, engineers and others caught there by the outbreak of the war.—*N.Y.W.-T.* (28)
 - 30—Lozovsky says Finns create difficulties in exchange of diplomats.—*N.Y.T.* (30)
 - 31—DNB announces establishment of German civil administration in "Ostland," comprising the area south of the Dvina captured in USSR.—*N.Y.T.* (Aug. 1)
 - 31—Rumania reports Soviet troops destroyed Bessarabian tobacco crop before retreating.—*N.Y.T.* (Aug. 1)
- August*
- 1—Reich Commissioners are appointed for Lithuania and undefined Ostland.—*N.Y.T.* (2)
 - 4—Karelian refugees of Finnish-Soviet War are instructed to report for permits to return to their homes in re-occupied territory.—*N.Y.T.* (5)
 - 4—Finland urges persons who left Helsinki during evacuation to remain in country districts due to food shortage.—*N.Y.T.* (4)
 - 8—Germany denies requests of Baltic Germans transferred to Poznan last year to return home.—*N.Y.T.* (9)
 - 10—TASS states Germany and Mannheim plan to place German prince on Finnish throne, ending republic.—*N.Y.T.* (11)
 - 11—German Ostland province to include Baltic states plus Belorussia, as soon as latter is pacified. Heinrich Lohse appointed Reich Commissioner for province.—*N.Y.T.* (12)
 - 16—TASS charges German command officially condones looting, in making public captured list of instructions governing soldiers' "requisitioning."—*N.Y.H.T.* (17)
 - 20—Madrid reports return of 360 Spaniards who had volunteered to fight against USSR, because they represent surplus manpower.—*N.Y.T.* (21)
 - 20—Norway reported worried by reports that Quisling plans stern action to

- get three thousand volunteers promised Hitler for anti-Soviet war, as recruiting has fallen very far short of goal.—*N.Y.T.* (21)
- 26—Second of two Belgian anti-Soviet volunteer contingents of 845 men each leave Brussels.—*N.Y.T.* (27)
- 26—Recruitment of French volunteers to fight USSR lagging despite high financial inducements, according to Vichy dispatch.—*N.Y.H.T.* (27)
- 28—Laval and Deat wounded at send-off rally for French anti-Soviet volunteers.—*N.Y.T.* (28)
- 27—Poles being sought as volunteers for German Army.—*N.Y.T.* (28)
- 28—Finnish military attaché at Washington says his country is only fighting to regain territories lost in previous year's war. Doubts participation in Leningrad siege.—*N.Y.T.* (29)
- 31—Russian paper in Berlin reports official new provisional order for farming in German-held Soviet areas to include maintenance of collective farms with additional allotments of land to peasants who fulfill German production quotas.—*N.Y.T.* (Sept. 1)

September

- 2—Lozovsky denies reports of peace negotiations with Finland.—*N.Y.T.* (3)
- 3—Berlin announces that "under no circumstances has Germany under international law any obligations to feed the population" of occupied Soviet areas, but, on the contrary, has the right to feed its own troops from the supplies of these areas.—*N.Y.H.T.* (4)
- 4—Soviet diplomat in Teheran charges that the leaders of German sabotage groups which operated in the Soviet Caucasus are among those enjoying the safety of the German Legation.—*N.Y.T.* (7)
- 5—All inhabitants of Lithuania have been made subject to the labor draft

under decree issued by Reich Commissioner for the East.—*N.Y.T.* (6)

- 9—Helsinki reports Finns have stopped attempting to advance after reaching old Karelian Isthmus frontier. Germans bring pressure to bear to secure their participation in the attack on Leningrad.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 10—Finnish Parliament approves law providing death penalty for parachutists. Helsinki radio says Finland plans to ask reparations for damage of 1939-40 war.—*N.Y.T.* (11)
- 14—Finnish government spokesman announces hopes of peace in near future, stating Finland is German ally only by accident and will not continue war longer than Finnish interests demand. V. A. Tanner, Minister of Trade and Communications, leader of Social Democratic Party, denies, however, possibility of separate peace.—*N.Y.T.* (15)
- 14—Slovak troops recalled from Eastern front because of mutinies and desertions.—*D.W.* (15)

IRAN

July

- 8—Ankara reports Soviet and British representations to Iran seeking expulsion of Germans. British reported massing on Iran border.—*N.Y.T.* (9)
- 26—It is reported from Teheran that 5,000 Germans recently arrived in Iran and are engaged in spreading Axis propaganda.—*N.Y.H.T.* (26)
- 27—Britain is reported to have protested to Iranian government on Germans there.—*N.Y.H.T.* (29)
- 30—Ankara reports influx of Germans bound for Iran. Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov visits the Turkish Foreign Office.—*N.Y.T.* (31)
- 31—Iran's reply on Nazis fails to satisfy Britain.—*N.Y.H.T.* (Aug. 1)

August

- 6—German note to Iran threatens rupture of diplomatic relations if Germans are expelled.—*N.Y.T.* (9)
- 8—Director of German Military Intelligence service and his immediate subordinate are reported to have left Turkey for Iran.—*N.Y.T.* (9)
- 11—Stalin note to Iranian Shah warning that Soviet troops will be sent to Iran under 1921 treaty if Germans are not curbed is reported in Ankara.—*N.Y.T.* (12)
- 20—London reports that Britain had given Iran a week in which to answer British-Soviet request for expulsion of Germans.—*N.Y.T.* (21)
- 23—Iranian reply to British-Soviet note reported unsatisfactory.—*N.Y.T.* (24).
- 25—Britain and USSR enter Iran to secure expulsion of Germans, and prevent its use as base for attack, according to statements. Soviet note reviews relations, bases action on 1921 Pact, pledges withdrawal when danger is removed.—*N.Y.T.* (26)

- 26—Lozovsky says Soviet-Iranian diplomatic relations remain, and are "friendly."—*N.Y.H.T.* (27)
- 27—Iranian cabinet resigns. Settlement offer reported.—*N.Y.T.* (28)
- 28—New Iranian cabinet issues "cease fire" order.—*N.Y.T.* (29)
- 31—British and Soviet forces in Iran effect junction at Kazvin.—*N.Y.T.* (Sept. 1)

Sept.

- 9—British-Soviet agreement with Iran provides that all airdromes, roads and communications be taken over by Allies; German, Italian, Rumanian and Hungarian Legations to be closed, all Nazis within Iran to be turned over to occupation authorities, and small strips along Soviet and Iraq borders be occupied by the Red Army and British forces, respectively.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 12—British and Soviet envoys protest Iranian editorial insisting on maintenance of Axis ties.—*N.Y.T.* (13)

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